A Catalyst in the Cotton: The Proper Allocation of the  Goodwill  of Closely Held Businesses and Professional Practices in Dissolution of Marriages by Haggar, Kelly M.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 65 | Number 3
Spring 2005
A Catalyst in the Cotton: The Proper Allocation of
the "Goodwill" of Closely Held Businesses and
Professional Practices in Dissolution of Marriages
Kelly M. Haggar
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Kelly M. Haggar, A Catalyst in the Cotton: The Proper Allocation of the "Goodwill" of Closely Held Businesses and Professional Practices in
Dissolution of Marriages, 65 La. L. Rev. (2005)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol65/iss3/11
A Catalyst in the Cotton: The Proper Allocation of
the "Goodwill" of Closely Held Businesses and
Professional Practices in Dissolution of Marriages
[I]nasmuch as you do not object to my taking my hog to
Nebraska, therefore I must not object to you taking your
slave. Now, I admit this is perfectly logical, if there is no
difference between hogs and negroes.'
-Abraham Lincoln, speech on the Kansas-Nebraska Act,
October 16, 1854
"Mrs. Truman, Mrs. Truman, I just heard your husband use
the word 'manure.' Can't you get him to stop? "
"'Why, no; it's taken me 30 years to get him to use that
word. "2
-Apocryphal story about President Harry Truman, first attributed
to opposition party politics in Wisconsin during the 1948
campaign; many variations of the story abound.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Noble Ellington, Jr. and Peggy McDowell married in 1964. They
jointly owned and operated a cotton brokerage firm, the Noble
Ellington Cotton Company, Incorporated (NECC), for more than
thirty years before finally divorcing in 1998.' The most hotly
contested issue in their property settlement was the proper allocation
and value of the family cotton business. The Ellington case turned
upon the treatment and value of the goodwill of their brokerage firm,
arguably a key element in determining the company's value.4 The
positions of the parties were not directly opposed at trial nor on
3. Ellington v. Ellington, 36,943 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2003), 842 So.2d 1160,
1163.
4. The reported case shows that the term "goodwill" was never defined by
either expert witnesses, by the trial court, nor by the appeal court. The term was
discussed by the experts, who disputed both its presence and its value. The Second
Circuit, "[h]aving reviewed extensively the jurisprudence regarding goodwill and
the propriety of its inclusion in the value of a community corporation such as
NECC," affirmed the trial court's holding, noting that "valuation of the Ellingtons'
business should include consideration of an intangible value predominantly
attributable to NECC's customer base." Id. at 1170.
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appeal. Mr. Ellington argued, in essence, that the family business had
no value apart from him.' Mrs. Ellington, to a somewhat less
theoretical approach, argued instead that the court must rely entirely
upon one side's experts or the other's, and thus could not mix
portions of each expert's views to craft a partition of their community
property.6 Ultimately, the trial court allocated NECC to Mr. Ellington
and compensated Mrs. Ellington for half of its value, for a sum of
$146,500.' The court derived that value from a combination of each
expert's conclusions.8
The trial court's written reasons for judgment concluded that the
family cotton business "can and does have an intangible asset value
and whether that intangible value is termed goodwill, customer base
or something else is not important. What is important, and also much
more difficult, is using intangible value in determining the total value
of the business. ' Both parties appealed but the Louisiana Second
Circuit Court of Appeal upheld the decision, stating that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in crafting a hybrid value from parts
of each expert's calculations."
Actually, whether the "intangible value" that the trial court
weighed is termed "goodwill," "customer base," or "something else,"
is supremely important. This comment's principal thesis is that
personal goodwill cannot be correctly classified as a marital asset in
either a common or a civilian law jurisdiction." By contrast, the
goodwill attributable to a distinct business or professional entity is
properly subject to a regime of community property in both
jurisdictions.
The following two major tenets support the thesis that personal
goodwill cannot legitimately fall into community property: 1) The
common law's concept of goodwill, as applied in divorce matters, is
5. Id. at 1166,1168.
6. Id. at 1166.
7. Id. at 1164-65.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1170.
10. Id. at 1164-65, 1171, 1175.
11. Note that the "gay marriage" debate arising from Goodridge v. Department
of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), does not affect this comment. The
sex of the other spouse will not affect goodwill, nor will the number of spouses
because under this proposal no one can hold a property interest in the personality
of another as valued in goodwill. Similarly, if the "effort, skill, and industry" of a
spouse is distinguishable from the things produced by that "effort, skill, and
industry," then the number or sex of the spouse(s) will not change the disposition
of goodwill. Note that the Louisiana Civil Code defines community property, in
pertinent part, as "property acquired... through the effort, skill, or industry of
either spouse." La. Civ. Code art. 2338. Article 2338 does not place that "effort,
skill, or industry" itself into the community.
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both too broad and too narrow. This conceptualization mixes
"personal" with "commercial" and "professional" (which is too
broad). It also encompasses only a portion of "commercial"
goodwill's true scope (which is too narrow), since it lacks the civil
law concept of "introduction." 2) That component of both
professional and commercial goodwill arising from one's personality
is exclusive to its possessor. It is thus separate property that should
not devolve into the community.
Within Louisiana, Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801.2 attempted
to exclude personal goodwill from community property when such
goodwill results "solely from the identity, reputation or qualifications
of the owner or from his relationship with clients or customers of the
business."' 2 Yet, one must assess the 2003 version of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:2801.2 as "unsuccessful" because the word
"solely" negates the new law whenever any portion of the goodwill,
however slight, results from any person other than the owner.
Accordingly, "solely" should be deleted or amended with a qualifier.
The Ellington case raises a multitude of perplexing theoretical
questions, the answers to which carry serious practical implications.
For example, just what is this "goodwill" so strongly contested in
Ellington? Is the "goodwill" of a professional practice, such as law
or medicine, different in any legally meaningful way from the
goodwill of an ordinary business? Is either type of goodwill even a
thing, such that it can be "property," at all? If so, is this intangible
property divisible? If it can be divided, should it be divided? (A
civilian would pose the question as, "Is it susceptible of partition?")
If personal goodwill can and should be divided between the spouses,
on what basis is it best apportioned? If it cannot be divided, should
the other spouse be compensated in some manner for goodwill of the
family business? For any of the personal goodwill of the other
spouse? These difficult issues surrounding the unique nature and
proper allocation of goodwill serve as the focus of this comment.
The Background section begins by considering the theoretical
foundation of goodwill within the framework of property law (Part
II.A.). A review of some threshold classification issues often
uncritically accepted follows, ending with a note of caution about the
12. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801.2 took effect on August 15, 2003.
Senate Bill 844 of the 2003 Regular Session became Act 837 when signed into law
by Governor Foster on July 1, 2003. See 2003 La. Acts No. 837, at Appendix 7.
However, as a result of an earlier draft of this comment, Revised Statutes 9:2801.2
was amended as suggested here in 2004. The current law took effect on August 15,
2004. See 2004 La. Acts No. 177, at Appendix 11. The full story of how "solely"
changed from "primarily" into the extensive revision finally passed must wait for
another day. Suffice it to say that "primarily" was as unfair in one direction as
"solely" was in the other.
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limited ability of the law to resolve value judgments. The next
section, Part II.B., traces the evolution of the concept of goodwill
from its birth in commercial contracts at common law. The shifting
content of goodwill in common law jurisdictions as the term
expanded in scope over the last few decades is the subject of Part
II.C. Part II.D. then turns to the latest iteration of goodwill and
explores its use in modem common law divorces. An examination of
the civil law concept of "clientele" forms Part II.E., the last
Background section.
The Analysis section begins by contrasting and comparing the
civilian doctrine of clientele with goodwill in Part IMI.A. Treatment
of the goodwill of closely held family businesses and professional
practices is then examined in three types of jurisdictions: (1)
Common law states without community property (Part ll.B. 1.); (2)
Common law states with community property (Part lI1.B.2.); and (3)
Louisiana, a "mixed jurisdiction" whose law is largely derived
from-and still heavily influenced by-the civil law tradition (Part
II.C.). This section devotes particular emphasis on one Louisiana
case, the property settlement in Ellington. A discussion of
Louisiana's legislative response to Ellington completes the Analysis
Section in Part II.D.
The Conclusion section, Part IV, contains both general
recommendations for matters of concept and doctrine (Part IV.A.) as
well as recommendations for addressing specific Louisiana issues
raised by Ellington and reflected in the newly enacted Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:2801.2 (Part IV.B.). "A Few Final Reflections"
completes the comment as Part IV.C.
II. BACKGROUND-GOODWILL: ORIGIN, FOUNDATION,
AND CONCEPTS
A. Doctrinal Foundations of Property: Patrimonial and Extra-
patrimonial Concepts
1. The Classification Question: When Is Goodwill
"Property? "
Before the Ellington case and the issues it highlights can be
profitably explored, the scope of the problem being investigated must
be both explicitly delineated as well as placed in its proper context.
Since personal goodwill can exist in both a closely held family
business and in a professional practice, the allocation and division of




The classic civilian approach to analyzing the role, mission, and
nature of a concept begins with assigning it to a specific location in
a taxonomy, within a codified system of law.13 There is no point in
pondering how to value a thing until it can be established that the
thing under scrutiny is "property." Once it is recognized to be
property, there is no point in attempting to divide it unless the judge
can be confident that it is community property. If it is separate
property, then only one spouse can own it, regardless of its
susceptibility to division. Thus, the only circumstance in which there
is work to be done by a fact finder is when a thing is both property
and subject to a claim by both spouses. Attempting to divide a thing
before confirming that it is, in fact, both property and divisible is the
difference between "doing a thing right" and "doing the right thing."' 4
Distinguished Louisiana commentators have previously discussed
the "property or not property" aspect of the goodwill problem.
Professors Spaht and Hargrave, in the Louisiana Civil Law Treatise,
observed that "[s]ome things are so intimately a part of one's body or
one's personality" that they cannot be "shar[ed]" with another
person.1 5 This property-patrimonial-extra-patrimonial distinction is
most difficult to apply to someone's personal qualities in divorce
litigation. They note that the "inquiry... goes beyond a definitional
approach" and thus "considers a broad range of... history and policy
concerns," with professional goodwill among the most current
controversies.' 6
"Patrimonial" is an alien term, but not an unknown concept, to the
common law. It is half of a pair. Its (fraternal) twin is "extra-
patrimonial." The "patrimony" of a person is the sum total of
13. See John H. Tucker, Jr., Foreword to Louisiana Civil Code (West 2004):
What is meant by the term 'code' as we use it here [referring to
Louisiana's Civil Code] is to designate an analytical and logical statement
of general principles of the law to be applied by deduction to specific
cases and extended by analogy to cases where the aphorism "au-deld du
code mais par le code civil" ("beyond the civil code but through the civil
code") can be applied.
14. "Peter F. Drucker once differentiated between doing things right and doing
the right thing:"
Doing things right has to do with efficiency, hence knowledge. Doing the
right thing has to do with effectiveness, hence wisdom. Much of the
knowledge I see being transmitted and shared is about efficiency, not
effectiveness. The righter we do the wrong thing, the wronger we
become.
Russell Ackoff, Commentary, 1 Reflections: The SoL Journal 56 (1999)
(emphasis added).
15. Katherine Shaw Spaht & W. Lee Hargrave, MatrimonialRegimes § 2.1, in
16 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1997).
16. Id.
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everything that person owns (or owes) with any economic value.'7 If
it can be bought, sold, or repaid, it is patrimony. However, some
things are enforceable as rights and duties, yet either cannot be
reduced to an economic value or their use for economic purposes is
illegal or otherwise contrary to public policy. These impossible or
forbidden rights and duties are "extra-patrimonial.' '  For example,
one has a right to marry. Once married, rights and duties accrue.
However, being married is an extra-patrimonial thing. No one can
"sell" a marriage.' 9 While some pose the question as "whether an
asset is 'property' or whether it is 'patrimonial,"' the better
distinction is not between "property" and "patrimony" but rather
between "property" and "non-property."2 °
Spaht and Hargrave further develop the very important distinction
between property and non-property by noting that "one's ability to
work and enjoy the fruits of his labor" is a valuable property right
nonetheless protected from, for example, "seizure by creditors," yet
that same ability to work "would not be part of the community,"
17. G~rard Cornu, Droit Civil: Introduction, Les Personnes & Les Biens, nos.
55-56, 30 (4th ed. 1990) (translated by J.R. Trahan, 1997).
18. "Certain rights have no pecuniary value." Alex Weill & Francois Terr6,
Droit Civil: Introduction G~n~ral, nos. 241, 255 (4th ed. 1979) (translated by J.R.
Trahan, 1997).
19. Id. "Different from patrimonial rights, extra-patrimonial rights are
nontransferable, intransmissible, unseizable, and imprescriptible." Id. The right to
marry is extra-patrimonial. Spaht and Hargrave also cite French commentators
wrestling with the disposal ofpersonal rights, saying: "Aubry and Rau suggest that,
except for rare cases, the distinction between patrimonial and extra-patrimonial
rights is in reality a distinction between rights which their subject may dispose of
and those which he may not. The extra-patrimonial interests can not be expressed
in currency because there is no market offering a current price for them." Spaht &
Hargrave, supra note 15, § 2.4. Examples given by Aubry and Rau of extra-
patrimonial rights include the rights resulting from marriage; rights derived from
paternity and status as head of family; the right of one to his own body and name;
and the intellectual right of an author to a work of art. Id. (citing Aubry & Rau, I1
Droit Civil Francais § 162, (P. Esmein 7th ed. 1961), in 2 Civil Law Translations
(La. State L. Inst. 1966)).
20. Spaht and Hargrave note that "[tihe Continental concept of patrimony and
its distinction between patrimonial and extra-patrimonial rights has been called 'a
distinction that has given rise to doctrinal controversies and has proved to be
analytically deficient."' Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 15, § 2.4 (citing A.N.
Yiannopoulous, Property § 127, in 2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d ed. 1980)).
Be that as it may, since this comment only examines the personal goodwill
associated with closely held businesses and professional practices in divorces, the
distinction's deficiencies in some other contexts are not a limiting factor here.
Moreover, Weill and Terr6 concede that the distinction is not "absolute" and
"sometimes lacks precision," although they maintain that "the distinction
corresponds to reality: certain rights have a pecuniary value while others have a
moral value." Weill & Terr6, supra note 18, no. 241. Perhaps a better phrase
would be "have only a moral value?"
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especially not for "wages earned after the termination [of the
community]" because such wages are separate property.2' Perhaps
these difficulties in assessing what is property at all, much less what
property is then subject to claims by more than one person, explain
why these issues are so often assumed away.
2. Uncritically Accepted Assumptions
Unfortunately, much (if not most) of the commentary on marital
and community property does not squarely address whether personal
goodwill is divisible or not during divorces. Instead, the
commentators tend to focus on problems that should come a step or
two later in the analysis sequence.22 For example, arguments over
which accounting method is best suited for weighing the proper
division of a professional practice (usually in law or medicine) simply
presume (a) that there is such a "thing" within the community and (b)
that this thing is subject to division.23  No point is served by
interminable accounting debates over the best means to divide an
indivisible thing, especially a thing that is not legitimately subject to
the jurisdiction of a court. Regrettably, many cases, as well as many
of the law reviews and explanatory articles for attorneys, begin with
the uncritically accepted assumption that personal goodwill is subject
to partition in a divorce. The bar journals are especially prone to
address the finer points of valuation methods without pausing to
21. Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 15, § 2.4.
22. Allen M. Parkman, A Systematic Approach to Valuing the Goodwill of
Professional Practices, in Ronald L. Brown, Valuing Professional Practices and
Licenses 6-1, 6-1 (3d ed. 1998), available at http://www.unm.edu/-
parkman/Goodwill.PDF.
23. See, e.g., Bryan Mauldin, Identifying, Valuing, and Dividing Professional
Goodwill as Community Property at Dissolution of the Marital Community, 56 Tul.
L. Rev. 313 (1981) (failing to appreciate the indispensable step of determining
whether the property is divisible in the analysis of goodwill). Another recent
comment forthrightly disparages any attempt to consider property rights, opining
that "engaging in an essentialist inquiry into the nature of property simply masks the
inherent normative choices." Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of
Marriage, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 75, 109 (2004). Au contraire, Mesdames; mes
aim~s. The only things "masked" here are the common law's lack of(1) rigor and(2) a taxonomy.
2005] COMMENTS 1199
0LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
consider if the enterprise itself is legitimate.24 Both trial and appellate
courts have also displayed this tendency.25
Valuation of an intangible (an "incorporeal" to a civilian) such as
goodwill in any business is problematic even under the "ideal"
condition of an arm's length sale to a third person. Valuing the
typical closely held family business is even more difficult. Valuing
a professional practice or a family business in a divorce is most
difficult of all, since there is no willing buyer and seller and no
disinterested outside party making the purchase.26
3. A Note of Caution
One caveat to keep in mind throughout this comment: many of the
problems discovered in this research effort are not truly "legal"
problems. A question posed as "Does the goodwill arising from
someone's professional practice fall into the community?" probably
does appear to be only a legal question. However, asking the
identical question with other words yields a far different result. If the
identical issue is instead presented as "Can someone's personal
qualities be owned by another person?," does it still seem to be only
a legal question?
At the end of the day, the controversy over personal, commercial,
and professional goodwill is not one which can be resolved by
24. See, e.g., Michael W. Kalcheim, Expert Testimony and Valuing Goodwill
at Divorce, 88 111. B.J. 652 (2000); Robert W. Levis, Valuation of Businesses in
Colorado Divorces, Colo. Law., June 2003, at 73; Allen M. Parkman, Human
Capital as Property in Divorce Settlements, 40 Ark. L. Rev. 439 (1987). See also
Allen M. Parkman, Human Capital as Property in Celebrity Divorces, 29 Fam.
L.Q. 141 (1995); Allen M. Parkman, A Systematic Approach to Property in
Divorces, 12 Fam. Advocate 34 (1989) [hereinafter Parkman, A Systematic
Approach]; Allen M. Parkman, The Treatment ofProfessional Goodwill in Divorce
Proceedings, 18 Fam. L.Q. 213 (1984). An expert in Ellington believed a step had
been skipped: "According to Mr. Clark, the company's [NECC] goodwill is
personal and therefore should not be considered." Ellington v. Ellington, 36,943
(La. App. 2d Cir. 2003), 842 So. 2d 1160, 1164 n.5.
25. On appeal the Ellington panel considered the challenge to partitioning
personal goodwill but followed an earlier business goodwill case, Godwin v.
Godwin. Ellington, 842 So. 2d at 1170 (citing Godwin v. Godwin, 533 So. 2d
1009 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988)). The Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal
recently reached the same conclusion as the Second Circuit in Schrio v. Schrio, 02-
542 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2003), 839 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 5th Cir.). Godwin and
Schrio both hold that personal goodwill is a divisible marital asset-a thing which
falls into the community-when it is attached to a commercial corporation, but not
when it is attached to a doctor's or lawyer's professional practice corporation.
26. For example, one expert in Ellington testified that "in a divorce situation
when you're settling property its [sic] very rare to have a willing seller . . ." and
"this is for property settlement purposes, you don't have to have a willing buyer or
a willing seller." Ellington, 842 So. 2d at 1167-68.
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lawyers, judges, and scholars alone. It is a values conflict, not a legal
question. Both case law and commentary are so widely split that
reliance upon finding "the answer" in any court room is misplaced.
No judge has an envelope on the bench containing "Colonel Mustard
in the Billiard Room with the Candlestick.,
27
Legal training can be of tremendous help in highlighting various
facets of an issue and exploring the consequences of different
outcomes. However, legal scholarship can only point the way to a
solution. Choosing the "correct" solution is another matter entirely.
Ultimately, in democratic societies, only the court of public
opinion--expressed at the ballot box-can truly settle values
questions. The Louisiana Supreme Court was keenly aware of this
"values-law" distinction when it observed:
[A court errs] in allowing its own policy determination to
override the policy determination made by the legislature. It
is not the prerogative of the judiciary to disregard public
policy decisions underlying legislation or to reweigh balances
of interests and policy considerations already struck by the
legislature. It is not our role to consider the wisdom of the
legislature in adopting the statute. It is our province to
determine only the applicability, legality, and constitutionality
of the statute.
Put another way, do values drive law, or does law drive values?29
Did hearts and minds change in America as a result of something like
the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964? Or, did the law change
because American hearts and minds had changed? Perhaps the
"thesis behind the thesis" of this comment is the bedrock belief that
27. Of course the reference is from the popular American board game "Clue."
28. Soloco v. Dupree, 1997-1256 (La. 1998), 707 So. 2d 12, 16. The United
States Supreme Court said essentially the same thing in Chevron US.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2793
(1984) (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195, 98 S. Ct. 2279, 2302 (1978)):
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision,
fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's
policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left
open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal
judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate
policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for
assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle
between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones:
"Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches."
29. For an expanded discussion of the interrelationship between law, culture,
and values, see Katherine Spaht, The Last One Hundred Years: The Incredible
Retreat of Law from the Regulation of Marriage, 63 La. L. Rev. 243, 245-47.
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law is meant to serve and protect values, not that societies have
values in order to serve law.
B. The Original Goodwill at Common Law
1. Initial Definition and Subsequent Development of Goodwill
Within Law
The initial case establishing goodwill as an asset of a business
doubles as another good example of the interrelationship between
values and law. At common law, the legal definition of the term
"goodwill" first appeared in Cruttwell v. Lye, an English case from
1810, as "[t]he goodwill, which has been the subject of sale, is
nothing more than the probability that the old customers will resort
to the old place."3  Lye's freight business had gone bankrupt.
Cruttwell bought "Lot 1 as the carrying business of George and
Edward Lye; together with the goodwill of the extensive premises in
Broad Street, Bath."'" Later, after new financing, Lye again offered
wagon deliveries "at the usual hours" although not by exactly the
same route as before. Lye and his son also solicited their former
customers. Cruttwell then moved for an injunction restraining the
bankrupt Lye and his son from carrying on his trade.32
This contract dispute turned on two questions: (a) exactly what
had Cruttwell bought? and (b) did that sale impinge upon Lye's
personal rights? Lord Eldon, presiding in this equity matter as Lord
Chancellor, settled the first question when he observed that Lye had
set up his revived freight wagon business as like, but not the same as,
the trade sold.33 As to the second question, Lye's counsel argued that
his personal rights could not be "deprived by the assignees, or any
other person" so Lye's right to resume his business was not "forfeited
by the bankruptcy... [and] ... could not be disposed of."34
This old English case is an eerie foreshadowing of the "personal
qualities" or "community property" tension found at the heart of good
will disputes in modem divorce cases (which will be fully developed
and demonstrated in Part II.D.). Lord Eldon, in 1810, saw the gravity
of the values conflict these issues presented in this apparently simple
30. 34 Eng. Rep. 129, 134 (Chan. 1810).
31. Id. at 130. Note most carefully that the Bankruptcy Court sold Cruttwell
two different things; "the business" itself and the "goodwill of the extensive
premises in Broad Street, Bath." Note also that the goodwill sold was "of the
extensive premises" at a specific location. It was not attached to nor formed by any
personal quality, neither of Lye nor of his son. Id.
32. Id.




case and enunciated them quite clearly in his opening paragraph. He
observed:
[o]n the one hand, if this court does not interpose, the Plaintiff
cannot possibly have what he really intended to purchase: on
the other hand, if the Defendant has a right to carry on this
trade, I should by interfering destroy that right to an extent,
which I could never remedy.
In the absence of either fraud or a non-compete agreement, Lord
Eldon could find no rationale to grant the injunction. "Fraud," he
wrote, "would [lead to a very different result]; but if [fraud] ... is
prevented [only by] ... means.., which belong to... the fair course
of a [lawful] trade, . . . I should, by interposing, carry the effect of
injunction to a much greater length than any decision has authorised,
or imagination ever suggested. 3 6
English case law that is almost 200 years old requires a bit of
careful parsing, but a fair contemporary reading of the 1810
conclusion, based upon the whole reported case, might be,
If Lye had pretended to be Cruttwell, then that fraud could
justify an injunction. However, Lye has a right to conduct a
lawful business. Interfering in Lye's personal freedom, where
there is no non-compete agreement, would stretch an
injunction far beyond its rightful limits. As between personal
freedom and the benefits of a contract, on these facts, freedom
must prevail.37
Meanwhile, in the United States, Justice Joseph Story wrote an
oft-cited, more elaborate definition of goodwill than that found in
Cruttwell. Section 99 of his 1841 treatise on partnership, which has
been cited in innumerable cases as an all-encompassing definition of
goodwill, is actually not Justice Story's final word on the subject. The
part of section 99 that is invariably cited as his view of goodwill is:
35. Id. at 134.
36. Id. at 131-32. Lord Eldon noted that the parties had no "covenant" not to
"engage in such trade." Id. at 132. Fraud was twice rejected. Id. at 133-34. A law
professor once observed "there are no solutions... only issues that are fought out
again and again." William F. Harvey, Speech to the Staff of the Legal Services
Corporation in Washington, D.C. (March 4, 1982), quoted in Alan Houseman &
John Dooley, Legal Services History 4-17 n.61 (1984). The modem reach of
business goodwill into community property settlements confirms Professor
Harvey's "endless struggle" sentiment.
37. Of course, anyone having read the complete Cruttwell case is welcome to
construct an alternate modem text as though Lord Eldon were rendering his opinion
today.
12032005]
4LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
an advantage or benefit which is acquired by an establishment,
beyond the mere value of the capital, stock, funds or property
employed therein, in consequence of the general public
patronage and encouragement which it receives from constant
or habitual customers, on account of its local position, or
common celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or
punctuality, or from other accidental circumstances or
necessities, or even from ancient partialities or prejudices.38
However, Justice Story was writing ofpartnerships, not about other
business combinations, much less about any family law matter. After
a review of several types of partnerships, he made a further observation
that cannot be regarded as anything less than devastating to those who
wish to ascribe business goodwill to personality: "It seems that good
will can constitute a part of the partnership effects or interests only in
cases of mere commercial business or trades, and not in cases of
professional business, which is almost necessarily connected with
personal skill and confidence in the particular partner."39
Moreover, the court in Douthart v. Logan, after quoting Justice
Story's treatise then immediately cited a second mid-nineteenth century
treatise,4° which raises an equally insurmountable obstacle to the
"business good will attaches to personality" position. The court was
impressed by Parson's
distinction... taken between "the good will of a partnership in
trade and that of a professional partnership. [Professionals] may
become partners; but the good will attached to [them] must be
considered more as a personal [thing] than as a local thing. It
is not a probability that the old customers will go to the old
place, but to the same persons, wherever they may be.'
38. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Law of Partnership as a Branch of
Commercial and Maritime Jurisprudence: with Occasional Illustrations from the
Civil and Foreign Law (1841).
39. Douthart v. Logan, 86 I11. App. 294, 310 (111. 1st Cir. 1899), affd., 60 N.E.
507 (I11. 1901) (quoting Joseph Story, Commentaries (7th ed. 1881)).
40. "In Parsons on Part., the author says, in speaking of good will and the
difficulty of giving a definition thereof, that.., the definition of good will ... from
Lord Eldon, 'is an exact statement of the legal meaning of good will."' Id.
Curiously, two different Parsons wrote partnership treatises in the late nineteenth
century. Theophilus Parsons wrote A Treatise on the Law of Partnership, while
James Parsons wrote An Exposition ofthe Principles ofPartnership. The Douthart
court cited Theophilus, not James, Parsons because James Parsons did not quote
Cruttwell.
41. Theophilus Parsons, A Treatise on the Law of Partnership 239 (Joseph
Henry Beale, Jr. ed., 4th ed. 1893).
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Moreover, Theophilus Parsons explicitly considered, but
rejected, the "objection" that good-will "be altogether dependent
upon place, and [thus] wholly independent of persons," preferring
instead the "kind and friendly feeling of others," which he felt Lord
Eldon's classic Cruttwell definition had captured as "the true
technical and legal meaning of the word [good-will]." 42 Parsons
explained in the footnote citing Cruttwell that good-will was legally
recognized as a locality only and not any personality because it left
the seller of the business "at liberty to set up the same trade in any
other situation.
43
The next milestone in the development of~goodwill at common
law occurred in England in Smith v. Everett. Smith was one of
two partners in a bank. When Smith died, Everett, the surviving
partner, put the bank up for sale. The buyers discovered under the
English banking laws then in effect that they could not issue bank
notes unless Everett remained with the new firm. He agreed to stay
on for one year, serving as an active manager during the first six
months. Smith's widow, unsatisfied with Everett's accounting of the
bank's books, sued him. She also asked for an increased share of
the sales price, believing at least some of the bank's value was
goodwill.45 If so, some part of the goodwill should fall into her late
husband's estate as a partner in the bank. Everett countered by
saying that the goodwill had no value whatever since, by itself, it
would not have included the building, any stock in the bank, any
right to issue bank notes, or any restriction of his right to remain in
the banking business in the same building.'
42. Id.
43. Id. at 239 n.8.
44. 27 Beav. 446 (1859). Smith is one of the cases "from the year 1785 as are
still of practical utility." 72 Rev. Rep. 484 (1911) (reprinting Smith). At least one
goodwill rule ofCruttwell-that any non-compete agreement must be express-was
intact and still functioning in England in 1911, a full century later. See id.
45. 27 Beav. at 448.
46. Id. at 450.
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The Master of the Rolls47 hearing the case, Sir John Romilly,48
reached one key conclusion in the first substantive paragraph of the
opinion, "entertain[ing] no doubt" that a proportionate "share of the
goodwill (where it is of any value at all)... [is a] part of the estate
of the deceased partner ... ."' Here, that would be half, from the
universal "Black Letter Law" that partners share equally, without
regard to such factors as which one does more of the work or
recruits more customers, and so on.5"
However, in the very next sentence, Sir John continued to say
that any goodwill interest "must be limited by the rights of the
surviving partner, and the consequences which.., follow from the
death of one of the partners."'" One such right, according to Sir
John, is "no one would have had any right to prevent [the surviving
partner] from carrying on the very same business on the very same
47. The "Master of the Rolls" is the chief of the Civil Division of the Court of
Appeal. See Kevin's English Law Glossary, Master of the Rolls, at
http://www.kevinboone.com/lawglosMaster of the Rolls.html. The position fills
the third seat of the Supreme Court of Judicature in England. The other two
members are the Lord Chancellor (the president of the Chancery Division) and the
Lord Chief Justice (president of the Kings Bench Division). See The 1911 Edition
Encyclopedia, Master of the Rolls, at http://13.191lencyclopedia.org/
M/MA/MASTER OF THEROLLS.htm. The incumbent Master of the Rolls in
June, 2003 was Lord Phillips. He described a few of his duties in a keynote speech
given at two Law Society Litigation Conferences:
It is now nearly three years since I took up my duties as Master of the
Rolls. When I did so I was not quite sure what the Rolls were of which
I was Master. I had, as have many people, a vague idea that they were
included on the roll of solicitors. That is not the case. The office of
Master of the Rolls originates in the 13th century long before solicitors
existed. He was assistant to the Chancellor, who was then the King's
Chaplain and secretary. The Master of the Rolls was also a cleric. His
task was to look after the King's official correspondence which was
recorded on parchment rolls and as a legacy of that task I still chair the
committee which advises the Lord Chancellor on Public Records. I
have nonetheless many duties in relation to your profession and I see
my role as essentially avuncular.
Lord Phillips, Master of the Rolls, Keynote Speech at the Law Society Litigation
Conferences (June 5, 2003 & June 19, 2003), available at
http://www.lcd.gov.uk/judicial/speeches/lp 190603.htm.
48. Historical point of curiosity: Sir John Romilly's father, Sir Samuel,
represented the unsuccessful Cruttwell thirty-nine years earlier in the original
"goodwill" case. See The 1911 Edition Encyclopedia LovetoKnow, John Romilly,
1st Baron Romilly, at http://29.191 lencyclopedia.org/R/RO/ROMILLYJOHN
_ROMILLY 1ST BARON.htm.
49. Smith, 27Beav. at 452.
50. For example, the Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 reads, "subject to any
agreement between them.., each partner shall.., share equally in the profits...
after all liabilities." Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 § 18.
51. Smith, 27 Beav. at 452.
[Vol. 651206
COMMENTS
premises as before," even if he somehow lacked the right to
continue business under the same name. 2
This follows one rule of Cruttwell: only an express covenant not
to compete can restrict the right to remain in (or reenter) a line of
trade. However, the other rule of Cruttwell, that goodwill is only the
chance of future business from old customers, is also repeated in
Smith. Sir John wrote that, since Everett could carry on with the
name "Old Sarum Bank," the value of the goodwill, "under the name
... 'New Sarum Bank,' with the chance of retaining the customers of
the former Bank, was exceedingly small, not to say infinitesimal. 53
While Sir John was quite confident of the controlling law in the
Smith case, he was greatly troubled by the scant evidence presented.
The legal principle that goodwill had a marketable value and could
thus be sold was not disputed. His problem in the case was his
inability to determine, from the facts before him, if any portion of
Smith's goodwill had been included in the original sale price of
£10,000 for the entire bank. After a subsequent special inquiry, he
held that the sale price had not included anything for goodwill, and so
Sir John awarded the widow £2,000 for Smith's half of the goodwill.
Her other claims, primarily the alleged mismanagement by Everett,
were all denied. 4
Looking back at this 1859 case through modem eyes, and from
the vantage point of goodwill in divorces, several aspects of Sir John
Romilly's holdings impinge upon the modem attempt to import
goodwill into family law. First, observe that Smith's personal
qualities played no role whatsoever in the case. Whatever goodwill
existed in the bank's assets only attached to the bank and not to either
partner. Smith's widow was entitled to Smith's share simply because
he had been a partner. Second, no personal quality of hers factored
into the goodwill, either. She now owned half the bank, so she
owned half of the bank's assets, which included half the goodwill.
Neither Everett nor Smith's widow inquired into any personal
relationship in this matter. The presence or absence of her support of
Smith during their marriage was irrelevant. Third, the goodwill was
not valued by how much it was worth to the surviving partner. It was
worth what a buyer would pay for the bank. Thus, goodwill operated
solely through commercial transactions, was not bound up in any




54. Id. at 456.
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2. Legal Treatment of Goodwill Through the Recent Past
Some measure of the stability and power of common law
precedent may be gauged by the fact that, 151 years after Cruttwell v.
Lye, and within the mixed common law-civil law jurisdiction of
Louisiana, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal nevertheless held
"[the] rule is that, in the absence of an expressed stipulation to the
contrary in the contract, the sale of a business with the goodwill
thereof does not prevent the vendor from engaging in a similar
business in the same vicinity or elsewhere. '55
Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court, seventy-one years after
Cruttwell and twenty-two years after Smith, upheld an express non-
compete clause in a contract of sale for a business and its attached
goodwill.56 This 1881 case, Morgan v. Perhamus, makes two more
noteworthy points. First, Morgan found Sir John's reasoning in
Smith v. Everett to be persuasive authority for the proposition that
"the good-will of a trade or business, when connected to it, is
property."57 Goodwill, as originally understood, had no independent
existence apart from a business and was therefore never a "personal"
thing. Second, Morgan contained a citation from yet another mid-
nineteenth century common law treatise (this one from England) that
displayed the consistent point of view at common law, explaining the
term "goodwill" as "generally used to denote the benefit arising from
connection and reputation, and its value is what can be got for the
chance of being able to keep that connection and improve it.... [The
goodwill of] an established business ... has ... marketable value,
whether. . . that of a professional man or of any other person. '"58
Note these three features of goodwill at common law as it
solidified in the mid-nineteenth century: (1) It attaches always to a
business, never to a person-not even to a professional person. (2)
Lindley is contemplating the sale of a thing, the goodwill of the
business, and not a sale of anypersonal characteristic of the seller of
that business. (3) The value of the goodwill does not depend in any
way upon some enhanced value over and above what the purchased
55. Ballero v. Heslin, 128 So. 2d 453, 455 (La. 4th Cir. 1961).
56. Morgan v. Perhamus, 36 Ohio St. 517, 524 (Ohio 1881).
57. Id. at 523 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 522 (emphasis added) (quoting Lindley, A Treatise on the Law of
Partnership (1860)). In addition, Lindley provides here yet another instance of an
old legal document eerily casting a shadow across a modem dispute. Notice how
clearly Lindley anticipated the "excess profits" issue in his brief paragraph when he
drew a distinction between "keeping a connection" and "improving a connection."
Over 140 years later, accountants and lawyers can be found still wrestling over
whether or not "increased profits" are a part of goodwill. Compare Lindley's
"keeping" versus "improving" profits distinction with the Parkman-Zipp-Levis
discussion of "increased profits" versus "excess profits." See infra Part II.C. 1.
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business should "normally" earn. For Lindley, a buyer is getting an
opportunity to do better, not an expectation, much less any
entitlement, to do better.59 Baron Lindley was hardly alone in this
view. Parsons, in at least the fourth edition of his treatise,
characterized the rate of return from the purchase of goodwill as "a
hope or expectation, which may be reasonable and strong... but it is
after all, nothing more than a hope, grounded upon a probability."66
The Louisiana Supreme Court reached the identical conclusion in
1947 that the Ohio Supreme Court had reached in 1881: "[absent] an
expressed stipulation to the contrary in the contract, the sale of the
good will of the business did not preclude [a defendant] from
engaging in a similar undertaking in [the same town] . . . or
elsewhere.' Moreover, in Dantonio v. Fontana, the Louisiana
Supreme Court confirmed Davis v. Dees.62 Also of interest is dictum
that the "[s]ale of a business and its good will does not preclude the
seller from competing in a similar business, not even shortly
thereafter and in the immediate vicinity., 63 The court then cited
Bergamini v. Bastian, summarizing its holding as "'in the absence of
an express stipulation ... a contract in restraint of trade cannot be
presumed and enforced by the courts,' citing American and French
authorities."' Additionally, the 1994 Dantonio Court found it useful
to note that the 1883 Bergamini opinion had relied upon "Justice
Story's much quoted, often paraphrased definition of good will,"
which the 1883 panel had quoted in full.6 5
The common law has had some subtle shifts in the legal definition
of goodwill despite the great overall stability of the term. The third
and last of the oft quoted definitions is by Justice Cardozo from a
case remarkably like Smith v. Everett. In re Brown also involved a
widow who believed the surviving partners had not properly
accounted for business good will (this time in a stock brokerage).6
After noting that "books abound in definitions of good will" so that
"[t]here is no occasion to repeat them," Judge Cardozo observed that
"any privilege that gives a reasonable expectancy of preference in the
59. Lindley's A Treatise on the Law of Partnership, although first published
in 1860, is not some obscure, obsolete treatise. The eighteenth edition, Lindley on
the Law of Partnership, reaching 1131 pages of text, was published in 2002 by
Sweet and Maxwell in London. See Lindley on the Law of Partnership (Roderick
C. L'Anson Banks ed., 18th ed. 2002). Baron Lindley, 1828-1921, entered the bar
in 1850 and had a distinguished legal career before finally retiring in 1905.
60. Parsons, supra note 41, at 239.
61. Davis v. Dees, 211 La. 229, 232, 29 So. 2d 774, 776 (1947).
62. Dantonio v. Fontana, 92-2844 (La. 1994), 636 So. 2d 218, 225.
63. Id. at 224.
64. Id. at 224-25.
65. Id. at 225 n.19.
66. In re Brown, 150 N.E. 581 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1926).
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race of competition" will be bought, whether "such expectancy ... [is
due to] ... place or name or otherwise" of a "business that has won
the favor of its customers."67 This "expectancy" ranges from "so
strong... [it] may be said to be a certainty" to "so weak that for any
rational mind they may be said to be illusory.
68
Many of the ancillary concepts examined in Smith were also
reviewed, without change, in Brown, such as the surviving partners'
right to remain in the brokerage business despite having liquidated the
partnership.69 For present purposes, however, the key fact of Brown,
regardless of the added factors used to generate good will ("place or
name or otherwise"), is that none of them were called out as a
personal characteristic of any individual.7 ° Even in Cardozo's-only
very slightly-expanded concept, goodwill is still solely a
characteristic of a business and not of a person.
Cardozo also clearly appreciated the wide range of variation in the
likelihood of some return from the goodwill purchased with a
business. 7' For Cardozo, the future return from goodwill can
legitimately be either a chance or a virtual guarantee. However, the
"rate of return's" size has no legal significance-both "certainty" and
"illusion" will still qualify as goodwill. Both flow from a business;
neither flows from any personal quality of the seller. Cardozo is not
excusing fraud when he speaks of "illusion." He is merely noting
how greatly valuation differences can be to "rational minds."
C. Broadening of the Goodwill Concept: Multiple Meanings in
One Term
As has been shown in Part II. B., the legal concept of goodwill, as
used and understood within the discipline of law, has been
remarkably stable for at least 160 years, and perhaps for almost 200
years, depending upon how alike one chooses to consider Lord
Eldon's view in Cruttwell and Justice Story's definition in his
partnership treatise.72 Of course, any rule can operate consistently
67. Id. at 582. One case Justice Cardozo cited as containing a "book" of good
will definitions was People ex rel. A. J. Johnson Co. v. Roberts, 53 N.E. 685 (N.Y.
Ct. App. 1899). Id. That case began with Cruttwell, included a different quote
from Sir John Romilly, and then carried Lindley's definition forward to the 1895
edition of his Partnership. Roberts, 53 N.E. at 688-89.
68. Brown, 150 N.E. at 582.
69. Id.
70. Roberts, 53 N.E. at 688-89 (citing Lindley, supra note 59).
71. The "certainty-to-illusion" spectrum of a case like In re Brown is treated
later as the "excess value" question. See infra part II.C. 1.
72. Of course a famous case draws commentary when cited in an appeal. An
1899 Illinois First Circuit case quotes an 1896 English case arguing that Lord
Eldon's definition is "too narrow," as follows:
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only when judges are confident that "the rule" is settled and further
that "the rule" applies to the case at bar. For example, a very late
nineteenth-century Illinois Court of Appeal opinion approvingly
quoted Lindley's belief that "[t]he term 'goodwill' can hardly be said
to have any precise signification. It is generally used to denote the
benefit arising from connection and reputation."73
"Goodwill," outside of law, is unfortunately still not well settled
almost 200 years after an English judge first laid down its parameters
within a courtroom. Numerous articles and cases illustrate that the
component parts of goodwill derived from accounting and economics
vary from case to case, as well as between equity matters and other
areas of the law, such as federal taxation in the United States. For
example, Alan S. Zipp, an attorney and a certified public accountant
(CPA), did not attempt a modem definition, concluding instead after
a survey of his two fields that "[g]oodwill is a mysterious possession,
elud[ing] precise definition,... [and, although all] experts agree it
exists, few experts agree on exactly what it is... [Many] have tried
If the language of Lord Eldon is to be taken as a definition of good will
of general application, I think it is far too narrow, and I am not satisfied
that it was intended by Lord Eldon as an exhaustive definition. Good
will must mean every advantage-every positive advantage, if I may so
express it-as contrasted with the negative advantage of the late partner
not to carry on the business himself, that has been acquired by the old
firm in carrying on its business, whether connected with the premises
in which the business was previously carried on, or with the name of
the late firm, or with any other matter carrying with it the benefit of the
business; and it is absurd to say that when a large wholesale business
is conducted the public are mindful whether it is carried on in Fleet
street or in the Strand.
Douthart v. Logan, 86 Ill. App. 294 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Cir. 1899) (quoting Trego v.
Hunt, Law Reports, Appeal Cases 1896, 17). The treatment of goodwill by
surviving partners and the conditions under which they might carry on the business
is an issue beyond the scope of this comment, although such points are extensively
covered in both the Story and Parsons treatises. See Story, supra note 38; Parsons,
supra note 41.
73. Id. at 309. Interestingly, despite the lack of precision inherent in the term
"goodwill," the Illinois Supreme Court not only affirmed every holding but thought
"[i]t would be interesting to consider the question as a legal one, so fully argued by
counsel, whether or not the business was of such a character as that, independent of
contract, there would be a good will belonging to the partnership." However, upon
review of the record, the court was
satisfied... there was no good will as an asset of the firm, and that it
was intended by the co-partners that there should be none. It cannot be
doubted that it would have been competent for the partners to contract
with each other that there should be no good will, to be considered as
property or as an asset of the co-partnership. Such a contract might be
expressly made, or it might arise by implication from other contracts
and the acts and conduct of the parties in interest.
Douthart v. Logan, 60 N.E. 507, 510 (I11. 1901).
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[to define and value it] but [t]he most striking characteristic of this
immense amount of writing is the number and variety of
disagreements reached."74 Yet another modem take on goodwill is
from the International Glossary of Business Valuation Terms. Robert
W. Levis cited that definition as "that intangible asset arising as a
result of name, reputation, customer loyalty, location, products, and
similar factors not separately identified."75
A leading indicator of the sometimes very subtle but still
profound shifting in meaning of the term "goodwill" occurring over
the last few decades is found in the current definition of goodwill in
Black's Law Dictionary. Lord Eldon might have recognized the first
half of this definition; Justice Story surely would have. Black's
initially focuses on a "business's reputation, patronage, and other
intangible assets.., considered when appraising the business, esp. for
purchase" but then adds "the ability to earn income in excess of the
income that would be expected from the business viewed as a mere
collection of assets. 7 6
However, the second half of Black's definition, the "excess
income" notion, is solely based upon economic considerations and
cannot be found in the line of cases stretching from Cruttwell through
Smith, Morgan, and Bergamini to Dantonio. Of course no one can
know what Lord Eldon or Justice Story would have made of the
"excess income" approach.7 7 However, one may nonetheless fairly
conclude even an extraordinarily skilled advocate would be hard
pressed indeed to extract the "excess income" concept from within
the Cruttwell-Dantonio line.
The Black's definition for goodwill, immediately after the
"reputation" and "excess" language, refers to a new term, "going
concern value." The definition further defines "going concern value,"
in pertinent part, as "the future earning power" of a business, "as
opposed to the liquidation value of the business or its assets. Going-
concern value includes, for example, goodwill."78 That goodwill is
74. Alan S. Zipp, Divorce Valuations of Business Interests: A Capitalization
of Earnings Approach, 23 Farn. L.Q. 89, 95 (1989) (citing J. Canning, The
Economics of Accountancy 38 (1929)).
75. Levis, supra note 24 (citing The International Glossary of Business
Valuation Terms).
76. Black's Law Dictionary 703 (7th ed. 1999). Zipp cited an earlier edition
of Black's: "the ability of a business to generate income in excess of a normal rate
on assets due to superior managerial skills, market position, new product
technology, etc. In the purchase of a business, goodwill represents the difference
between the purchase price and the value of the net assets." Zipp, supra note 74,
at 95 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 625 (5th ed. 1979)).
77. In fact, there is still some measure ofconflict today between accounting and
law as to what "excess" actually means. See infra Part II.C. 1.
78. Black's Law Dictionary 1549 (7th ed. 1999).
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so closely bound up with its corresponding business entity that it
cannot be had apart from that business is unremarkable.79
However, the Black's concept of goodwill goes a step further,
subsuming goodwill within still another concept, "going
concern." 80 Additionally, cases occasionally co-mingle these two
concepts.8 1
1. Accounting and Economic Views of Goodwill
As Allen Parkman noted, economics explains why goodwill
exists, while accounting measures its value. These economics and
accounting concepts might distinguish business and personal
goodwill of professional practices, influencing how they should be
treated in property divisions.82 This "distinguishing" task is highly
problematic, since "what the courts is [sic] treating in many cases
as professional goodwill is just personal goodwill based upon the
individual's reputation."83
So, "[firom an economic perspective, goodwill is an asset,
whose value-as with all other assets-depends upon the future
returns it will generate.... The economic concept of goodwill is
introduced when the future revenues of an organization cannot be
assigned to the contribution of a finite list of assets .... [It] is
79. See, e.g., Vonderbank v. Schmidt, 44 La. Ann. 264, 266-69, 10 So. 616,
617-18 (1892). Numerous other cases over the last 150 years hold that goodwill
cannot be acquired separately from a business entity.
80. For a more detailed examination of the mixing of "goodwill" with "going
concern," especially in tax matters, see infra Part II.C.2.
81. Goodwill was held to be a component part of a going concern in Gaydos
v. Gaydos, 693 A.2d 1368, 1375 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). However, that case was
also remanded with instructions to deduct the professional goodwill of the husband's
dental practice from the marital estate. Id. The Gaydos court "in no way wish[ed]
to add to the confusion in this area of law, and recognizing the trial court's best
efforts in resolving this confusion... [but] suspect[ed] that much of what the trial
court considered going-concern value was actually professional goodwill." 1d.
But, the Gaydos opinion also stated that "[g]oodwill is, therefore, one benefit
among many ofowning a fully-functional business rather than a collection of assets.
It follows that goodwill value is a component of the going concern value of a
business; goodwill and going concern are not 'separate methods' ofvaluing the same
intangible thing." Id. (emphasis in original). It is therefore an open question
whether Gaydos adds or subtracts from the legal confusion about personal goodwill
in divorces.
82. Parkman, A Systematic Approach, supra note 24, at 1. Of course, the
central dispute in such cases as Ellington is whether business and personal goodwill
should be distinguished. "[I1t is difficult to adapt the standard method for
calculating business goodwill in an on going enterprise to individuals." Id. at 10
(emphasis added). Well, yes... exactly!
83. Id. at 11.
2005] COMMENTS 1213
4LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
created by the standard economic method of investing current
resources to increase future profits. 8 4 By contrast, "[t]he general
guides for thinking about accounting goodwill are: (1) a payment
in excess of an established value of a resource and (2) enhanced
earning power. 8 5 Since many other intangibles can increase the
value of a business (patents, trademarks, and leaseholds), "their
value is frequently attributed to goodwill. 86
Zipp's conclusion from the perspectives of both accounting and
law is a remarkable point of view. He believes "[t]here is no
substantive difference between commercial goodwill and
professional goodwill from either a legal or an economic
perspective" since both just "represent the value of a going
business" above the value of "the underlying tangible assets.""
So, in his view, "marital property rules treat [both types of] these
businesses as valuable property rights which must be considered
in making equitable distributions and monetary awards."88
At least three important concepts warranting close examination
are tightly packed into Zipp's few lines. First, these statements are
true only if one assumes that some personal attribute of an
individual can be a thing owned by more than one person. Second,
they deal with the "excess" concept as solely the difference
between the return from the mere tangible assets of a business
versus the return from the entire business. Third, they assume that
professional goodwill is a business.89
Moreover, there is some dispute as to the meaning of "excess
value." Parkman sees both "greater profits" and "increased future
profits" as features of business goodwill.9" On the other hand,
Levis, a Colorado CPA, sees "excess" as Zipp does, meaning a rate
of return higher than the market rate "over a 'reasonable, fair
84. Id. at 6-8.
85. Id. at 8.
86. Id. at 8-9.
87. Zipp, supra note 74, at 102.
88. Id.
89. A key goal of Parkman's was to "analyz[e] the difference between the
business goodwill of the professional enterprise and the personal goodwill of the
professional individual." Parkman, A Systematic Approach, supra note 24, at 1.
"It is important to realize that goodwill is an asset of the business, not of any
individual." Id. at 8. This accounting and economics subpart only reviews the
second concept, "excess value." For coverage of the other points, see the clientele-
goodwill summary infra Part III.A.
90. Id. at 8. This is because, if "a business is more profitable than its
competitors because of the superior abilities or business connections of an
individual,... the profits of the firm will return to a normal level and any enhanced
profits will disappear" if that key person leaves. Id. For Parkman, goodwill thus
both attaches only to the business and also explains higher than normal profits.
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market compensation.' ' 91  Levis refers to any "excess"
compensation as "part of the 'income normalization' process. '"92
The accountants thus have several methods for calculating
goodwill but no plain definition of it. In Parkman's view, "[t]he
general feeling is that verbal descriptions of goodwill are inadequate
and that the only way to measure what is meant by goodwill is to
observe the way that it is measured." 93  The economists have
various explanations for the existence of value in a company over
and above the tangible assets of the firm but they leave the
calculating of its value to the accountants.94
91. Levis, supra note 24, at 74.
92. Id.
93. Parkman, A Systematic Approach, supra note 24, at 8. Parkman was
writing in 1998, so the controlling directive for goodwill was still Accounting
Principles Board Opinion 17 (APB 17), "Intangibles," issued in August 1970. As
he said in 1998, "Goodwill is not defined in Accounting Principles Board Opinion
17, but the measurement process, deductive in nature, is described." Id at 8 n.45.
However, beginning with fiscal years starting after December 15, 2001, the June
2001 Statement ofF inancial Accounting Standards no. 142 (SFAS 142), "Goodwill
and Other Intangible Assets," superceded APB 17. See Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards no. 142, Introduction. SFAS no. 142 defines goodwill as
The excess of the cost of an acquired entity over the net of the amounts
assigned to assets acquired and liabilities assumed. The amount
recognized as goodwill includes acquired intangible assets that do not
meet the criteria in FASB Statement No. 141, Business Combinations,
for recognition as an asset apart from goodwill.
Id. no. 142, appendix F. SFAS no. 141 is primarily noted within the financial
community for substituting the "purchase" method for the "pooling" method in
mergers and acquisitions. See id. no. 141. A typical characterization of the effect
of these two new financial policy statements is made by Caliber Advisors, Inc.:
Caliber regularly advises public and private companies on the value of
intangible assets, their economic lives and levels of impairment.
Recent accounting rule changes require companies to:
1. Provide much more detailed information about intangible assets
and purchase allocations.
2. Regularly review the value of these intangible assets for
impairment, including goodwill.
In 2001, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) approved
two new statements (141 and 142) to redefine the ways in which firms
report acquisitions. Statement 141 eliminated the ability to use
pooling-of-interest accounting, which allowed firms to protect their
reported earnings from acquisition amortization expenses. Statement
142 rule eliminated the need to amortize goodwill, and instead
established standards for evaluating goodwill impairment on an annual
basis.
Caliber Advisors, Inc., SEC Reporting: SFAS 141 abd 142 Engagements, at
http://www.caliberadvisors.com/newssfas 141 and 142.htm.
94. Parkman, A Systematic Approach, supra note 24, at 2.
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2. Importation of "Going Concern" Into "Goodwill"
Some authorities do continue to maintain the distinction
between these two concepts. For example, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court still recognizes them to be different, and
"technically distinct," with "going concern" meaning "the ability of
a business to generate income without interruption [despite a]
change in ownership" while goodwill is the more like the traditional
"preexisting relationship arising from a continuous course of
business which is expected to continue indefinitely."95 However,
any close examination of the relationship between "going concern"
and "goodwill" must inevitably lead into the Internal Revenue
Code, in which Congress has chosen to puree goodwill with going
concern.
96
Whether by accident or design, Congress firmly mixed and mated
what should be two distinct concepts in its income tax statute.
Section 197(d)(1)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code includes
"goodwill," without defining it, in a list of things which includes,
inter alia, the terms "going concern" and "workforce. 97 These listed
factors require consistent tax treatment. Slightly further along in the
tax laws, one comes to section 197(f)(1)(B), a "Special rule for
covenants not to compete," which provides that no such covenant (by
which Congress means any "other arrangement" to that effect), "may
be treated as disposed of (or becoming worthless) before the
disposition of the entire [business] interest described... [in the non-
compete agreement]."" Again, that goodwill can have no
95. Butler v. Butler, 663 A.2d 148, 152 (Pa. 1995). Even here, however, notice
that the definition of goodwill has shifted in emphasis away from pure law and
towards economics. Cruttwell's "probability," in the sense of "the chance the old
customers will still come," has gone from a "preexisting relationship" (old
customers remaining with the new firm) to become a "continue indefinitely"
expectation, rather more like a guarantee than a chance. On the other hand,
Pennsylvania does not presume that goodwill must reflect a "course of business"
that is more profitable that the "usual" rate of return. "Excess" in that sense is
absent here. One is reminded of the comment supposedly made by the one term
New York Mayor Abe Beame, circa 1975; words to the effect that he would not rest
until every resident of the city had an "above average" income.
96. The tax code impinges upon goodwill in divorce actions in at least one
other way. The "willing buyer, willing seller" formulation plays a role in
calculating goodwill. See 26 C.F.R. § 25.2512-1 (2002). While useful in valuing
a community business being sold to an outsider, the formulation is of little help in
divorces. Ellington v. Ellington, 36,943 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2003), 842 So. 2d 1160,
1167.
97. I.R.C. § 197(d)(1)(A) (2002).
98. Id. § 197(f)(1)(B).
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independent existence apart from a business is universal Black Letter
law. 99
Moreover, the implementing Treasury Department regulation
places both "goodwill" and "going concern" into the same paragraph
and refers to another paragraph as to whether the goodwill does or
does not "attach to the assets."' 00 The tax regulations do not finally
define these two terms, "goodwill" and "going concern," until yet
another paragraph.' The first is given as the "expectancy of
continued customer patronage." This falls strictly in line with two
centuries of the classic common law understanding of the term
"goodwill." The second definition, for a "going concern," is "the
additional value that attaches to property because of its existence as
an integral part of an ongoing business activity." Two things should
be immediately apparent. First, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
is explicitly attempting to correct an error made by Congress by
separating "goodwill" and "going concern" back into two distinct
things. Second, the IRS presumes that the income stream from the
concern being sold will not be interrupted by the change in
ownership.
Restoring this distinction is to the credit of the IRS. There need
not be any connection or linkage whatsoever between any personal
quality of a firm's present owners (such as reputation, skill,
knowledge, or work ethic) and an interrupted future income stream.
For example, there are closely held family businesses owning vast
tracts of land (6,400 acres-ten square miles-in a single plot) in
Louisiana with one hundred year timber leases from major lumber
and paper concerns. Should these families ever elect to sell their
firms, any new buyer would be as assured as anyone can ever be of a
reliable future income stream. Moreover, no part of the value of the
remaining forty-six years (of a one hundred year lease signed in 1949)
of timber operations bears any relationship even to the business
acumen of the leasing firms. Unless and until people stop having
babies and living in homes, the Pinus taeda (a variety of pine tree
commonly harvested for lumber) will continue to become two-by-
fours.
99. Moreover, nothing mandates that every business has goodwill. There are
abundant cases involving media outlets holding that people do not listen to a radio
station or watch a television station because of its owners or its management.
Customers tune to the programs, not to a station. Whatever goodwill is present
attaches to the personalities on the air and not to the personalities in the front office
or to the station itself. See KFOX, Inc. v. United States, 510 F.2d 1365, 1377
(1975); Meredith Broad. Co. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1214, 1216 (1971).
100. 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.197-2(e)(1), 1.1060-1(b)(2) (2002).
101. Id. § 1.1060-1(b)(2)(B)(ii).
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Finally, the United States Supreme Court has joined the periodic
grappling with the concept of goodwill a time or two, usually in tax
cases. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States contains a
useful, tightly bundled thumbnail of several of these concepts. 1 2
Morning Ledger cites Metropolitan Bank's "consider[ing] whether a
newspaper's goodwill survived after it was purchased and ceased
publishing under its old name."'0 3 Metropolitan, "relying on Justice
Story's notable description of 'goodwill,"' concluded goodwill "did
not survive" such a sale.'l° The other cases Morning Ledger followed
were Des Moines Gas (goodwill is "that element of value which
inheres in the fixed and favorable consideration of customers, arising
from an established and well-known and well-conducted business")105
and Los Angeles Gas ("going concern" is not the same thing as "good
will" in computing "rates for public utilities").0 6
Everyone has heard the phrase "a difference in degree, not in
kind." Morning Ledger illustrates that distinction perfectly. This tax
case turned on deductibility versus amortization of the goodwill
represented by subscriber lists after a merger of two newspaper
companies. 7 In a pure business context, involving only the
straightforward application of accounting principles and the tax code,
the mixing of law, accounting, and economics in this fairly
complicated goodwill tax issue resulted in a simple, although
controversial, outcome-the newspaper was allowed the deduction."'
However, attempting to blend these same accounting and
economics principles into divorce settlements is not a matter of
degree. It is a difference in kind. People are not businesses. Personal
102. 507 U.S. 546, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993).
103. Id. at 555 (citing Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U.S.
436, 13 S. Ct. 944 (1893)).
104. Metropolitan Bank, 149 U.S. at 446, 13 S. Ct. at 948 (citing Story, supra
note 39, § 99). Note that the Justice Story text quoted in Metropolitan Bank was
his first formulation covering ordinary commercial partnerships and not the second
one on professional partnerships.
105. Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153, 165,35 S. Ct. 811,814
(1915).
106. Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n of California, 289
U.S. 287, 313, 53 S. Ct. 637, 647 (1933).
107. Morning Ledger, 507 U.S. at 550-51, 113 S. Ct. at 1672-1673.
108. Id. at 572, 113 S. Ct. at 1683. Morning Ledger was a 5-4 decision. Justice
Souter's dissent quoted both Lord Eldon's Cruttwell opinion, originating the legal
definition of goodwill, as well as Justice Story's classic definition. Significantly,
Justice Souter followed Metropolitan's use of Story's first formulation (for ordinary
commercial partnerships) and not the second one (for professional partnerships).
Joining in the dissent were both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, an
unusual alignment to say the least. Congress created section 197 of the Internal




characteristics are not assets. The sort of dispute involved in
Morning Ledger is not simply "more difficult" or "less certain" when
transferred into the realm of some particular person's knowledge,
skills, effort, or reputation. The problem is not that the accounting
razor is too thick or too dull when used on personal goodwill in lieu
of business goodwill. The problem lies in making the attempt at all.
The problem lies in attempting to cut something that is not there. The
problem lies in treating the personal attributes of a human being as a
divisible community asset. The next part of the comment begins
analysis of the practical difficulties flowing from the attempt to value
people as businesses.
D. Goodwill as Currently Employed Within Common Law Divorce
Litigation
1. The Present "Two Source, Two Effect" Concept
Numerous experts have attempted to provide guidance to
practitioners on the sources, nature, differences, and similarities of
various types of goodwill as it affects partitions. Kalcheim's thoughts
are typical of that effort, noting that valuators often attempt to
measure "personal goodwill using accepted methodology even when
no enterprise goodwill exists" because it is so difficult to factor out
"personal goodwill from enterprise goodwill, particularly where one
spouse is involved in a professional service business such as a
medical, dental, accounting, or law practice."' 9 The problem "is not
limited to service businesses" since "any business where the earnings
are largely due to the spouse's personal efforts poses this problem,"
such as "insurance agencies and construction companies. 11 0 In his
opinion, "[t]he confusion in the courtroom arises less in the law than
in the proofs. Personal and enterprise goodwill may or may not
appear to be mutually exclusive.""
109. Kalcheim, supra note 22. Another way to cast the thesis of this comment
could be, "Do not use accepted methodology to calculate the value of a thing that
cannot be sold, traded, or transferred, such as an attribute ofsomeone's personality."
110. Id.
111. Id. Still another way of stating the thesis of this comment could be,
"Personal and enterprise goodwill must always be mutually exclusive." Similarly,
Parkman has argued that Kalcheim's "confusion in the courtroom" was induced by
importing an accounting concept of the same name but with a different meaning into
the legal arena. For example, he highlights In re the Marriage ofLukens, 558 P. 2d
279 (1976), as a good "illustrat[ion of] the problems when the courts recognize a
concept from another field, in this case goodwill, and then establish an
inappropriate method for its valuation." Parkman, A Systematic Approach, supra
note 24, at 6 n.38.
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Another authority, Robert W. Levis of Colorado, endeavoring to
provide guidance to lawyers attempting to sort out how the varieties
of goodwill affect a partition, writes that "differences in assigning
value [for goodwill].., usually relate primarily or exclusively to the
difference between 'enterprise goodwill' and/or 'professional
goodwill."' ' 2 The former is "the intangible value ... associated
primarily with the business as an institutional entity," while the latter
is "the intangible value ... associated primarily with the individual
practitioner or owner/operator of the business."' 3 While Levis
cautions that this "distinction between enterprise goodwill and
personal goodwill is not always clear," it is necessary for "a
well-performed valuation analysis" because, in his home state of
Colorado, both "are considered property."' 14
The valuator's problem in weighing a business value that
"transcends the individual owner or practitioner," has a "different risk
profile," has a "different value" from "the same level of expected
income," and may or may not be "associated exclusively with the
individual owner of the business" is "one of the most challenging
tasks associated with appraising business interests.""' 5 Therefore,
"[t]he business valuator . . . should attempt to identify whether
income is being generated by the entity or by the individual.""6 Levis
notes that this "separation" difficulty (the value of enterprise goodwill
minus the value of any personal goodwill) "is not unique to marital
dissolution proceedings" since it must also be done in an ordinary
sale of a business." 7  However, this valuation process "is more
difficult" for a divorce than in a sale because "a cash equivalent value
opinion must be the end result," yet a divorce is quite "[u]nlike an
acquisition transaction, [where] the business's value can ...be
conveyed via structure and contracts."18
Tracing the first source-effect pair, "enterprise-commercial"
goodwill, reveals that it attaches to the business itself and is an
integral part of it. Enterprise goodwill is thus an inextricable feature
of what a civilian would say is a separate juridical person, an
"artificial person;" what the French would call a "moral person."1 19




116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. Id.
118. Id. Of course, if the income is being generated by the individual rather
than by the entity, how can anything but a human being be the object of valuation
here?




"Enterprise" goodwill is thus the source of "commercial"
goodwill. However, the better analysis would be that they are but two
different names for the same concept. Consider how one common
law practitioner sees the interaction between "enterprise goodwill"
and "personal goodwill." Randall B. Wilhite argues that goodwill of
a business "ascribable only to an individual owner," especially to one
who "is selling (and leaving the business)," is "almost never part of
the compensation paid by the buyer" for the business. 120 Anytime
there is a turnover of personnel, "there is no assurance that the
continued goodwill of a business will continue" because, regardless
of "individual work effort," the true factor is whether the good will
"can be transferred as an asset of the business rather than the
individual."''
Wilhite went on to observe that "[m]any courts around the
country draw a line between various components of goodwill"
because any value from "personal goodwill.., will be realized, if at
all, only with post-divorce efforts of that person," while "entity
[business/commercial/ enterprise] goodwill is divisible as an asset of
the marriage . . . because it is [not] particularly germane to the
persona of the individual" selling the business. 22
Three things stand out in Wilhite's modem commentary on the
relationship between "enterprise" (or business/commercial) and
"personal" goodwill that could have been written by Lindley, Parsons,
Eldon, or Romilly: (1) personal goodwill is not a "thing," not
"property," such that it can be sold; (2) the "sale" of personal
goodwill is actually a "non-compete" agreement; and (3) marketable
goodwill is only the expectation of repeat business to the new owner
from customers of the old owner. Nonetheless, despite this sound
doctrinal beginning, Wilhite then elects to blur the vitally important
difference between value attached to a business and value attached to
a person as follows, "In this article, no distinction is made between
professional goodwill andpersonalgoodwill, and further, all personal
goodwill will be that goodwill, if any, in a business that is related to
one or both of the divorcing spouses, and not any other individual
employees in the business. 2 From that premise, the inevitable
result can only be the valuation of a human being, not of the business
he or she owns.
120. Randall B. Wilhite, The Effect of Goodwill in Determining the Value of a
Business in a Divorce, 35 Fam. L.Q. 351, 354 (2001).
121. Id. at 355.
122. Id. at 358-59.
123. Id. at 359 n.24 (emphasis added).
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2. The Cumulative Impact ofAccounting and Economics on
Marital Property Concepts
Goodwill as a legal concept arose purely in a business context and
the legal understanding of it has worked quite well in the business
arena for nearly 200 years. Perhaps a second year law student ought
to pause before challenging as venerable and as established an
institution as Black's Law Dictionary... but.., its two entries,
"goodwill" and "going concern," are poorly drafted. However, the
slow but significant falling away from the original legal concept
underpinning goodwill so evident in Black's today is more of a
symptom than a problem. It is simply another reflection of the
damage and confusion created in law by importing accounting and
economics concepts with the same name as important legal concepts
but with quite different meanings. 124 As Alan M. Parkman so well
observed, "[i]n no area is this ad hoc approach [of assessing
goodwill] more visible than the courts' consideration of the goodwill
of professional practices. Th[ese] . . . dispute[s] in property
settlements at divorce" are due to a "lack of an understanding of what
is goodwill, how it is created and how it should be valued. 1
25
Even doctrinal works of law have been adversely affected by
imported accounting principles. The Spaht and Hargrave treatise
contains an examination of the "commercial-professional" goodwill
problem that displays a position incompatible with civilian doctrine.
Their analysis of the treatment of a consulting engineering firm in a
partition turns on the "underlying reason for excluding good will in
the valuation of some professional practices" being "essentially
capitalization of future earnings" such that "separate future earnings
[should not] be treated as present community property., 126 For them,
the dispositive factor is "whether the good will value represents future
earnings or not. ,127
The better reason to exclude personal goodwill is that no personal
attribute can be owned by two people. An individual's personality
must always be separate property, to the extent that it can ever be
property at all. Their treatise rejoins sound civilian doctrine a few
lines later, holding that such a case should focus on "whether the
[professional] corporation had value and could continue to produce
income even without the efforts of the former husband." This fact
based inquiry would focus on the capabilities of the three other
124. See supra note 111.
125. Parkman, A Systematic Approach, supra note 24, at 1.
126. Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 15, § 2.8, p.5 (Supp. 2002) (examining





employees and the likelihood of their being able to produce business
and profits without the principal. 128
Goodwill arose in the pure business context and the legal
understanding of it has worked quite well in that business arena for
nearly 200 years. The whole problem with goodwill in divorces arose
when the urge to "collectivize" the income generation capability of
a couple collided with the centuries old legal principle that a
community property regime terminates at divorce. 2 It thus became
necessary to modify (or "distort," depending upon one's point of
view) the definition of goodwill sufficiently so that it could apply to
a characteristic or quality of a person instead of only attaching to a
business.
Frantz and Dagan argue that half of all future income (traceable
to any origin whatsoever within the duration of the marriage), from
whatever source derived, goes to the ex-spouse. 3 ° They are not
concerned with professions, businesses, goodwill, or any other
breakdown by category. If income to the ex-spouse had any origin,
however slight, from within the marriage, it is divisible community
property. 3' That some portion of this income is generated by any
personality feature of the ex-spouse or that it will not be earned until
after the divorce is, to them, irrelevant. The ex-spouse acquired the
ability to earn income during the marriage so that ability is itself
community property. The proceeds of this asset-earning ability of
community's are therefore divisible without regard to when they
accrue or are received. 132 This amounts to shifting the future earnings
of an ex-spouse back into the community by characterizing them as
some sort of current marital asset.
The concurring opinion from Chandler in Idaho is critical to
understanding the adverse effects within family law of the application
of the business concept of goodwill to people: "A spouse's
knowledge, background, talents, abilities.., and so forth are not
community property ... [they are] separate property. Discounting
estimated post-divorce income to a present value does not convert it
128. Id.
129. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 23, at 110. Frantz and Dagan's use of
"collectivize" offers a splendid opportunity for iconoclastic feminist legal
scholarship: construction of a legal rationale that simultaneously undercuts the
sexual objectification of women while supporting the objectification of ex-spouses
as a feature of the businesses they own or the professions they practice.
130. Id. at 107.
131. Id. at 108.
132. Id.
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into community property."'33 Three key points flow from these two
lines in Chandler.
First, the essence, albeit unarticulated, of the "personal goodwill"
position is that the community never ends. Frantz and Dagan
explicitly want half of all future income dedicated to the ex-spouse
even if those dollars are not earned until after the divorce. "[Division
of] a spouse's future earning potential gained during marriage...
should extend to [all] future earning potential generated during the
time of marriage, however derived." , 34 This isn't because there is
some accounting reason, or some economic rationale, to "correctly
value" a restaurant (or a medical practice, a book of contacts, or a
legal practice, etc.) as of the divorce. Instead, a policy choice, a value
judgment, has been made. As they phrase it, "[a] commitment to the
ideal of marriage as an egalitarian liberal community requires treating
spouse' increased earning capacity as marital property ... [3;] this
proposal may be the most important reform we recommend." 3 This
is a "results oriented" shoe horn at work. Nothing in accounting or
economics dictates any particular disposition of the future income of
a divorced doctor or cotton broker. Nor is either accounting or
economics cited to justify the policy.
Second, the laws of forty-nine of the fifty states must be changed
to make this capture of "future earning potential" possible, since
"[c]urrently, most jurisdictions refuse to include increased earning
capacity within the marital estate. In fact, only New York has a
clearly established rule making at least some of this
asset-professional degrees obtained during marriage-eligible for
division."' 36  Since the community supposedly terminates in a
divorce, all income from restaurant, legal or medical practice, carpet-
laying, or cotton-brokering operations must stop falling into the
community once the community terminates. The challenge, is to
somehow divert a future revenue stream and freeze it within the
community before pen touches paper. Goodwill simply serves as the
vehicle of choice to shoe horn what is undeniably future income back
within a community. The accounting buzz and methodology disputes
133. Chandler v. Chandler, 32 P.3d 140, 149 (Id. 2001) (emphasis added). As
contrasted to Frantz and Dagan, Justice Eismann, found that "[a] spouse's
knowledge, background, talents, abilities, reputation, work ethic, and so forth are
not community property, even if they were enhanced during the marriage." Id.
(emphasis added).
134. Frantz and Dagan, supra note 23, at 107.
135. Id. at 107-08.
136. Id. at 107. Frantz and Dagan could not consider Louisiana's Civil Code
article 121, "Claim for contributions to education or training; authority of court,"
as an acceptable substitute for half of future income. Since article 121 is basically
only a recapture of investment expenses and not a share of future profits, perhaps
merger and acquisition specialists ought to double as pre-marital counselors?
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amount to creating a means to pull the future into the present. This
isn't because there is some objectively "correct" way to value a family
business or a professional practice during a divorce. The buzz is
being employed because it is the only way to make the future apart
of the past.
Idaho saw seen this conflict between future earnings and present
marital property quite clearly, as noted in Chandler.3 ' Other
common law jurisdictions courts have as well. For example, in Yoon
v. Yoon, the Indiana Supreme Court explicitly held that "goodwill that
is attributable to the business enterprise is divisible property, but to
the extent that the goodwill is personal to the professional or business
owner, it is a surrogate for the owner's future earning capacity and is
not divisible.' 138  In contrast,' the Frantz and Dagan comment
explicitly takes the view that future income is divisible by means of
calculating its present value. 1
39
Proponents of the "professional" or "personal" goodwill concept
are pursuing more than some sort of mere reimbursement. Frantz and
Dagan see the ex-spouse's share of post-divorce income as a pure
entitlement. They reject any sort of return on an investment
contributed towards the education of the professional spouse by the
non-professional spouse. 40 They believe that, since
137. Chandler, 32 P.3d 140.
138. Yoon v. Yoon, 711 N.E.2d 1265, 1265 (I11. 999). Yoon expressly rejected
a ruling made just eleven years earlier, Porter v. Porter. Porter held that "a
professional practice's goodwill value may be included in the marital estate for
purposes ofproperty distribution pursuant to a dissolution decree." Porter v. Porter,
526 N.E.2d 219, 225 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). However, the Yoon court stated, "To
the extent that Porter suggests that both personal and enterprise goodwill are to be
included in the value of a business or professional practice in a dissolution, it is
disapproved." Yoon, 711 N.E.2d at 1269.
139. In fairness, they do acknowledge the "serious intrusion on exit by placing
a heavy and unjustified burden on future decisions concerning one's career,"
something that creates an obvious tension between the ideal of a "clean break" and
future career planning. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 23, at 111-12 & nn. 160-61.
Frantz and Dagan are also aware that apportioning future income not only interferes
with "autonomy" but can create a perverse incentive to not work as hard. Id. See
also id. at 107 n.143 ("Encumbering spouses' future career choices in such a way
is inconsistent with a commitment to no-fault divorce.").
140. Early efforts to capture future professional income sought to have the legal
or medical license itself declared community property. Muckleroy v. Muckleroy,
498 P.2d 1357 (1972), a New Mexico case, was such an attempt. The court ruled
a license to practice medicine "cannot be the subject of joint ownership." Id. at
1358. Spaht and Hargrave's "What Assets Are Shared?" discussion, closely tracks
New Mexico's treatment of this medical license. See Spaht & Hargrave, supra note
15, § 2.8. Both acknowledge that a license is a protected property right in one
context while neither sees that same license as "property" in a community property
context. Even Frantz and Dagan concede that "a spouse cannot sell her professional
degree," and go on to cite a case with that holding, In re Marriage of Graham.
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[a]limony is associated with need... [it] unjustifiably
diminishes a spouse's entitlement to the other's
increased earning capacity . . . [A]ssociating [an
alimony] . . . claim to this marital asset with
dependency.., sends the wrong cultural message..
. [since, if] each spouse is entitled to the other's
increased earning capacity, he or she should not forfeit
these entitlements on remarriage, or because of hard
work or simple good 
fortune.'a
Naturally, the whole reimbursement issue can only revolve around
degrees or licenses acquired after marriage. But what about a doctor,
lawyer, or engineer who marries only after graduation? In that event,
what is the basis for a claim by the other spouse for increases in
earning ability during the marriage?' 42
Frantz & Dagan, supra note 23, at 107 & n. 151 (citing In re Marriage of Graham,
574 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. 1978)). Of course, some states, Louisiana among them,
have either statutes or case law that explicitly allow the non-professional spouse to
recover the educational or training expenses furnished to the other spouse. See,
e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 121. However, the comments to Louisiana Civil Code
article 121 make absolutely clear that no license or degree is ever community
property under any circumstances. Article 121, with its caption, reads:
121. Claim for contributions to education or training; authority of court
In a proceeding for divorce or thereafter, the court may award a party
a sum for his financial contributions made during the marriage to
education or training of his spouse that increased the spouse's earning
power, to the extent that the claimant did not benefit during the
marriage from the increased earning power.
The sum awarded may be in addition to a sum for support and to
property received in the partition of community property.
Moreover, a license or degree holder reimbursing the community for the
expense of getting that license or degree is fairly consistent with the "title-finance"
distinction that the French follow. The comments to articles 121 through 124 do
not refer to the French "title-finance" doctrine because the two concepts are not
quite on point. Interview Saul Litvinoff, Reporter for the Civil Code (Oct. 20,
2003). However, it is arguable that the operational effect of articles 121 through
124 i to codify something similar to that French doctrine in Louisiana law.
141. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 23, at 108-09.
142. If a purely economic, but nonetheless polite, term describing behavior such
as remaining "entitled" to a portion of an ex-spouse's future income after divorce
is needed, "rent seeking" might suffice. Rent seeking "consists of legitimate, non-
voting actions that are intended to change laws or administration of laws such that
one individual and/or group gains at the same or greater expense to another
individual or group." J. Patrick Gunning, Understanding Democracy, An
Introduction to Public Choice Chap. 16. Another definition is "[t]he expenditure
of resources in order to bring about an uncompensated transfer of goods or services
from another person or persons to one's self as the result of a 'favorable' decision
on some public policy." Leon Felkins, Rent-Seeking Behavior, at
http://www.magnolia.net/-leonf/politics/rentseek.html. Felkins observes:
The term seems to have been coined (or at least popularized in
Third, if "a spouse's knowledge, background, talents, abilities...
and so forth" are "separate property," as previously observed in
Chandler, there is nothing for a court to divide. If that is so, then the
value of any goodwill not attached to a business-be it high, medium,
or low; professional or personal-is irrelevant. If that is so, the
"difficult to value" limitations of accounting and economics become
irrelevant. The impossibility of fulfilling a task becomes irrelevant
once the attempt to perform the task is abandoned. Or, as Gertrude
Stein (of Oakland, California) once said, "There's no 'there' there. 143
No part of this comment quarrels with any battle of expert opinion
about the goodwill, going concern aspects, or non-compete features
in the sale of a business per se. Neither is any difficulty in arriving
at the value of a business at issue here. No one goes to a hot dog
stand because of the reputation of the cook. General Electric is going
to sell light bulbs and jet engines to people watching NBC televison
shows who have never heard of Jack Welch and could not care less
who he is. Whatever brand name loyalty or location premium or any
other intangible may attach to some business really is something
accountants can dispute in an arm's length commercial transaction.
However, when it comes to determining the present value of the
increased skill with a pen, trowel, gavel, carpet iron, or scalpel that
Tom, Dick, or Harriet managed to pick up while married, the whiff
of an old auction block is in the air.
There is no avoiding the issue: because the common law concept
of goodwill neither arose from a rigorous taxonomy nor resides
within one, it (a) merges distinct issues, (b) muddles and blurs key
differences, and (c) does not consider at least two of the obviously
foreseeable configurations in the sale of a business.'" The care of
and feeding of goodwill in property settlements has thus become a
hopeless muddle of opposite and illogical results across these United
States. For example, a recent casenote from Idaho pondering an
inconsistent holding by that state's Supreme Court suggested that
"courts must . . . first decid[e] whether goodwill exists due to
marketability or ... because [of] . . . value to the owner ... by
contemporary political economy) by the economist Gordon Tullock.
Examples of rent-seeking behavior would include all of the various
ways by which individuals or groups lobby government for taxing,
spending and regulatory policies that confer financial benefits or other
special advantages upon them at the expense of the taxpayers or of
consumers or of other groups or individuals with which the
beneficiaries may be in economic competition.
Id.
143. Everybody's Autobiography, Chap. 4 (1937).
144. The two foreseeable configurations are "introduction" and "clientele." For
a treatment of both, see infra Part II.E. 1.
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looking to the facts of the particular case. Once these determinations
are made, the valuation method applicable to the case becomes
evident and less confusion will result."' 4 5
Adopting a doctrinally sound scheme with more precise and
realistic definitions avoids most, if not all, of the confusing and
inconsistent outcome that was the central theme of the Chandler
casenote.' 46 As stated previously, the proper place to begin an inquiry
into the partitioning of goodwill is whether or not this "goodwill"
even constitutes a "thing" within the legitimate scope of a court to
divide. Only if the goodwill is community or marital property is there
any need to inquire further. Instead, the current common law concept
of goodwill in divorce actions has "growed like Topsy," coming to
understand-without conscious plan or design-that two sources
create goodwill, "enterprise" and "personal," and that these sources
produce two types of goodwill, "commercial" and "professional."
This is the dominant understanding of "goodwill" in the common
law-based jurisdictions of the United States, essentially all states but
Louisiana.
The Frantz and Dagan comment is simply the latest in a series of
legal articles furnishing a legal rationale for the effects produced by
importing accounting and economics concepts into family law.
Again, some legal theory was required to support awarding future
income as part of divorce settlement outside of alimony.' The
plaintiffs bar simply discovered what an alteration of goodwill would
do before the academics found that marriage could host an
"entitlement" to half of all post-divorce income.'48 Parkman
pinpoints a 1956 California case as the initial "deterioration" of
goodwill when Mueller held that goodwill also existed in the
"personal service" of a dental laboratory. '49 By 1974 in California, an
145. Courtney E. Beebe, The Object of My Appraisal: Idaho's Approach to
Valuing Goodwill as Community Property in Chandler v. Chandler, 39 Idaho L.
Rev. 77, 109 (2002). See also Chandler v. Chandler, 32 P.3d 140 (2001).
146. Beebe objected to Chandler because it used a different method to calculate
goodwill. Prior to Chandler, goodwill in Idaho divorces was measured by what an
outsider would pay for the family business. Chandler also allowed the goodwill to
be valued by its worth to the spouse allocated the business by the court. This latter
approach was the one used by Louisiana in Ellington.
147. Miod challenges the propriety of such "double dipping," saying,
"[c]harging one party in a marital dissolution with the community property goodwill
and using the same earnings to compute spousal support is counting the same
income twice." Donald John Miod, The Double Dip in Valuing Goodwill in
Divorce 10, available at http://www.expertlaw.com/library/attyarticles/Assets
/double-dip.html.
148. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 23, at 108-09 n. 139 (strongly advocating
the "entitlement" point of view).
149. Parkman, A Systematic Analysis, supra note 23, at 3 (citing Mueller v.
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expert witness could be "asked to determine the fair market value of
goodwill of a medical practitioner, not of his business."'150 Foster
regarded "the personality of the parties engaged in the business" as a
factor in that property settlement. 15' However, despite the broadening
scope of goodwill, many states do not apply the newer definitions in
family law cases. As will be shown in Part III.B., there is
considerable disagreement over what is "marital property" (in states
whose laws flow from the common law tradition) as well as what
falls into a community regime (in community property states).
By contrast, as will be next demonstrated in Part Il.E., the civilian
tradition of clientele encompasses everything that the common law
usually considers as either "enterprise" or "commercial" goodwill as
well as additional features that the common law does not consider.
Moreover, the civil law treats both "personal" and "professional"
goodwill in a radically different way.
E. Clientele in the Civilian Tradition as Seen in Contemporary
French Doctrine
The emphasis is "contemporary." The comprehensive reform of
June 13, 1965 understandably had a wide ranging effect on family law
in France, provoking much debate among scholars. '52 The discussion
of clientele and its effects in Parts II.D. 1. and II.D.2. is based upon
three sources reflecting this spirited debate: (a) present French law,
which is still the June 13, 1965 package of Code Civil articles; (b) the
majority position among today's French legal scholars
("juriscounsels" or "jurisconsults" in civilian terms) interpreting the
1965 laws; and (c) Professor Trahan's unpublished survey of the
pertinent community property law as it developed in France from the
mid-19th century to today. Many of the policy arguments typified in
the Frantz and Dagan comment arose within France around the time
of Smith v. Everett, more then a full century ago, although French
scholars sympathetic to the Frantz and Dagan view did not begin
Mueller, 301 P.2d 90 (1956)).
150. Id. (citing Foster v. Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577 (1974).
151. Id. (citing Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d at 583).
152. Due to time, language, and budget constraints, this part of the comment
does not attempt to cover the development of French law and doctrine concerning
clientele in anything like the depth devoted to the parallel development of goodwill
in England and the United States. All of the doctrinal sources in Part II.E. were
translated from original French works by Professor J.R. Trahan of the LSU Paul M.
Hebert Law Center. Additionally, Professor Trahan's unpublished brief survey of
French family law over the last 150 years was instrumental in composing this "mini-
introduction" to clientele [hereinafter Trahan Survey].
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"tout[ing] ...in earnest [that] ...approach" until more recent
times. "
1. Scope and Meaning of the Civilian Term "Clientele"
The present day understanding of the civilian term "clientele"
flows primarily from two articles in the French Civil Code, their Code
Civil. The first is article 1404, which reads, in pertinent part,
[The following things] constitute separate things by nature,
even when they have been acquired during the marriage,...
the clothing.., personal. . . to one spouse, personal injury
awards, . . .and, more generally, all goods that have a
personal character and all the rights exclusively attached to
the person.154
The second major article is 1469, which reads, in pertinent part:
Compensation is, in general, equal to the lesser of the two
sums than represent the expenditure made [on the one hand]
and the subsisting profit [on the other hand]. [Nevertheless,
the compensation] cannot be less than the subsisting profit
when the value [of community property] that has been
borrowed served to acquire, conserve, or ameliorate a good
that, at the time of the liquidation of the community, still
remains in the patrimony of the borrower [spouse]. 55
The majority of contemporary French scholars writing of clientele
as affected by articles 1404 and 1469 recognize it to have two
subtypes: "professional" and "commercial." Both are "transmitted in
the same way ... the successor is made to pay for the transferor's
presentation of him to the clientele and for the transferor's
engagement not to compete with him."' 5 6 In actual daily operation,
the "non-compete" aspect of selling a business or profession is not as
cut-and-dried as this Marty and Raynaud text suggests. While this
"presentation," also known as an "introduction," is a necessary
element of all such sales, non-competition does not automatically
follow by operation of law. Another pair of doctrinal authors, Aubry
and Rau, observe that a common rationale explains why neither
"professional" nor "commercial" clientele can be community
property. They maintain "present[ing] a successor to the clientele,
153. Parkman, A Systematic Analysis, supra note 23.
154. C. civ. art. 1404 (J.R. Trahan trans.).
155. Id. art. 1469.
156. Gabriel Marty & Pierre Raynaud, Droit Civil: Les Regimes Matrimoniaux
No. 181, at 150-51 (2d ed. 1986) (J.R. Trahan trans.).
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while engaging [to leave] the profession, constitutes a prerogative
that's too personal to be able to fall into the community .... One
should also regard as personal the right of a business representative
or an insurance agent to present his successor." '157 As it happens, in
the vast majority of such sales, a non-competition agreement is part
of the sale. However, it is neither legally required nor assumed by
law in France.' It is, however, the common practice.
The French see this "right of introduction" as the key element in
the purchase of any business.'59 The seller (vendor) introduces the
buyer (vendee) to his former customers, recommends the new owner
to them, and-frequently--explicitly pledges not to compete with the
new owner. A French buyer isn't paying for the right to get old
business repeated. The French vendee is paying for a handoff, for the
passing of a baton. The doctrinal problem for civil law with this
"right of introduction" did not lie in "May the seller charge the buyer
for an introduction?" All the juriscounsels agreed that an
introduction to a business was as marketable a thing as was the
business itself. No, the problem was more "Must the vendor share
the civil fruits (here, money) of the introduction thus sold with his
spouse?"' 60 The fairness of designating all the money received from
a "passed baton" as solely the separate property of the professional
(or the commercial) spouse has troubled commentators (although a
minority) in France for a century. They argued that strictly personal
things must be extra-patrimonial; things without pecuniary value. If
money changes hands for this right of introduction, then surely at
least some portion of that money must necessarily be
patrimonial-how could money be otherwise?-and thus at least
some of that money must necessarily fall into the community. The
search for a theoretical foundation to justify placing a share of these
professional and commercial introductions into the community
eventually settled upon a late eighteenth century formulation, the
titre-finance pair.'6 '
157. 8 Charles Aubry & Charles Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Francais No. 166, at
296-98 (Paul Esmein & Andr6 Ponsard rev., 7th ed. 1973) (J.R. Trahan trans.).
Again, despite the apparently clear text of Aubry and Rau, a non-competition
agreement is not automatic under French law.
158. Trahan Survey, supra note 152, at 3. Nonetheless, both civilian tradition
in general and Louisiana in particular provide that "custom" is a source of law. See,
e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 1. "Custom results from practice repeated for a long time
and generally accepted as having acquired the force of law." Id. art. 3. However,
custom "may not abrogate legislation." Id. See also id. cmt. d ("In all codified
systems, legislation is the superior source of law."). Thus, at some point, custom can
reach a "tipping point" and become law.
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French law originally developed titre (title) andfinance (finance)
to deal with a special form of property with an income stream, the
"ministerial office." (At the time, some government positions could
literally be bought.) If a couple divorced, how should the office be
treated? What if the wife had put up most of the purchase price, yet,
of course in 1782, the commission was only in the husband's name?
The French resolved these questions by holding that the profits of an
office, the "finance," were community assets, while the holding of the
office and the duties of it, the "title," were strictly personal to the
officer holder.'62 Moreover, the non-officer spouse was compensated
by the office-retaining spouse for any separate property contributed
in purchasing the office. (Adoption of the Code Napoleon in 1808
codified these doctrines.)
In modem times, Malaurie and Ayn~s observe that a type of titre-
finance distinction has been extended to such diverse civil clienteles
as medicine, law, architecture, and insurance. They also note that
either of two foundations in doctrinal works would suffice for
excluding a professional's personal attributes from the community:
the "all-of-a-personal-nature-is-a-separate-thing" school of thought
as well as the classic "titre-finance" distinction. 13 They go on to cite
a Cour de cassation6' decision upholding the "mixed" character of
a clientele. In essence, while the proceeds of the sale of a practice fell
into the community, the "confidence and free choice of the sick...
remains attached to his person [the surgeon] and is, therefore,
untransferrable."' 61
More than just "doctrine," meaning the writings of (frequently
self-described) "eggheads" in the civilian tradition, supports both the
"community-separate" and the "finance-title" distinctions. Article
1404 of the French Code Civil excludes from the community "all
property which has personal character" as well as "all rights
exclusively attached to the person." 166 Gerard Comu writes that the
"incorporeal goods" category ("intangibles" at common law)
"includes within it ministerial offices and 'clienteles' of liberal
professions... [because] ... these incorporeal properties present an
accentuated personal character."'' 67
162. Philippe Malaurie & Laurent Ayn~s, Cours de Droit Civil: Les Regimes
Matrimoniaux Nos. 365-366, at 167-70 (1988) (J.R. Trahan trans.).
163. Id. at 169.
164. The courde cassation, "court ofbreakingjudgments," is the highest French
court for some matters, including family law.
165. Malaurie & Aynds, supra note 162, No. 366 n.122.
166. Trahan Survey, supra note 152.




Some French courts, even prior to the reform of July 13, 1965,
had held that the monetary value of the "right of introduction" being
sold was a community asset. 168 This is not remarkable, in that all
proceeds from the sale of a community business fall into the
community. The obvious problem in a divorce, of course, is that the
partitioning of a community from a dissolving marriage is not a
"willing buyer, willing seller" sale.
2. Effects of Clientele on Marriage Dissolution in Civil Law
Jurisdictions
While community property in France consists of the same "goods
proceeding from the personal industry of the spouses" as in
Louisiana, and such things as "acquets," the acquisitions, fall into a
French communityjust as into a Louisiana one, no French community
ever contains any of the personal qualities that produced or earned
those goods. 169 This result flows from.Articles 1401 and 1404 of the
French Civil Code; "rights exclusively attached to the person" are
always separate things.
The French concept of clientele produces several effects when a
community business is partitioned. First, the French do not confuse
the goods obtained by personal industry with the personal industry
itself. The goods themselves are community property; they must be
divided. If they cannot be divided, they are allocated, with the other
spouse receiving a compensating offset. However, the personal
attributes producing those goods are never within the community.
Second, the French do not mix accounting or tax principles into their
matrimonial regimes. Such concepts as "going concern" are not a
part of "clientele."
A sound doctrinal foundation makes sorting out the problems of
life easier. It is one thing for the spouse retaining a family business
to indemnify the other spouse through the community for expenses
the two of them incurred when purchasing a clientele or an office
during their marriage. It is quite another thing to regard the
168. Id.
169. Louisiana establishes a "legal regime of community of acquets and gains"
which "applies to spouses domiciled in this state." La. Civ. Code art. 2334.
Louisiana's community property article, in pertinent part, reads:
The community property comprises: property acquired during the
existence of the legal regime through the effort, skill, or industry of
either spouse; property acquired with community things or with
community and separate things, unless classified as separate property
under Article 2341; ... [and] natural and civil fruits of community
property ....
Id. art. 2338.
170. C. civ. arts. 1401, 1404 (Fr.) (J.R. Trahan trans. 1997).
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knowledge, skill, or reputation of one person as somehow requiring
a reimbursement to the other party for continuing to possess that
knowledge, skill, or reputation. Regarding things as "property" when
they are not needlessly generates disputes over what "my fair share"
should be. The French avoid all of the controversy attached to
personal qualities in the United States by not allowing anyone's
personal qualities to ever become a "thing to be shared" within the
legal arena. Gertrude Stein's "no 'there' there" applies once again. 1
Unfortunately, not all legal systems enjoy the benefits of a sound
doctrinal foundation. Part III, Analysis, next examines some of the
adverse effects that flow from the doctrinal weaknesses that are the
root of the partition problems involving goodwill in modem divorce
litigation.
I. ANALYSIS: TREATMENT OF GOODWILL IN DIVORCE ACTIONS
WITHIN BOTH TRADITIONS
Practical considerations (budget, time) and a manageable scope
must constrain every disciplined, focused research effort. Since this
comment seeks to be useful for practitioners, judges, and scholars in
both common law states and in Louisiana, coverage of multiplejurisdiction types is appropriate. In fact, a hyper-technical purist with
deep pockets and no calendar could maintain that there actually are
at least five possible baseline configurations to evaluate, not two.
Rather than only "common law" and "civil law," the purist's five
possibilities could be: (1) civil law (for example, France); (2) the
original common law (for example, 1890 New York); (3) common
law, but with martial property (for example, 1990 New York); (4)
common law, but with community property (for example, California);
and (5) a mixed common-civil jurisdiction (for example, Louisiana).
However, examination of all these possibilities is beyond the scope
of this comment.
Instead, this comment endeavors to strike a fair balance between
ignoring important distinctions while still capturing for analysis a
reasonable portion of the full legal spectrum concerning goodwill.
Hence the comment only considers contemporary civil law (here,
represented by the legal scholarship of modern France) and common
law principles (here, represented by a range of American cases). The
Analysis Section, Part Ill, reaches three of the purist's five
possibilities directly and one by proxy. Directly covered are "purist
(3) common law, martial property," "purist (4) common law,
community property," and "purist (5), mixed common-civiljurisdiction." The proxy is "purist (1), civil law."
171. See supra note 114.
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A. Clientele and Goodwill: Congruent, Analogues, or Quite
Dissimilar?
Clientele can be an analogue of goodwill in at least two ways.
Both attach to a business. Both intend to achieve the same
goal-repeat business from customers of the old owner-but by a
slightly different route. Where a common law business purchaser is
paying for the hope that the old customers will remain, a civil law
business vendee has bought an introduction to the old customers. The
civil vendee automatically obtains that right of introduction without
any express demand for it. By contrast, the common law buyer only
acquires the goodwill of the firm by expressly including it in the
contract. A common law buyer may or may not receive a non-
competition agreement. While a civil vendee does not automatically
obtain that right, the prevailing usage includes it. Clientele can also
attach to a professional practice, although the modem French apply
"profession" to many occupations not generally recognized as
"professional" in common law states, such as to insurance agencies.
To a civilian, the sale of a profession is simply the sale of a business.
The "goodwill-clientele" differences are fairly narrow for business or
commercial goodwill.
Where the two concepts, clientele and goodwill, do diverge
radically is over personal goodwill. The civil law simply has nothing
like the "personal" goodwill causing the pronounced split in case law
in the United States. Anything strictly personal to one spouse will
always be separate property in a civil jurisdiction. It will never be
subject to partition as community property. An Ellington-type result
is not possible in a civil law jurisdiction. By contrast, depending
upon state law, a thing as personal as a particular set of names in the
memory of one spouse may or may not be a compensable item of
community property. Thus, the short answer to the question of Part
HI.A., "Congruent, Analogues, or Quite Dissimilar?," is "Always
'analogue' for commercial and business, always 'quite dissimilar' for
personal, and 'it depends on your domicile' for professional."
B. Common Law-Based Jurisdictions
1. Common Law Without Community Property
Spaht and Hargrave's treastise offers a keen insight into why
martial property states have so much more difficulty with the
treatment of separate property and "exotic assets" than do community
property states. A true community property state must consider three
distinct operations: (a) management of the community during the
12352005]
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marriage; (b) transmission of the community upon death of a spouse;
and (c) partition of the community assets if the spouses divorce. By
contrast, the martial, or equitable, property states only deal with
divorces. As a result, community property states more easily "find
that exotic assets are marital property" and so can "apply equitable
notions."'
17 2
a. Mississippi, Represented by Singley v. Singley
The Mississippi Supreme Court case, Singley v. Singley, did not
arise from a closely held family business as did Ellington, but was a
dispute about valuation of a dental practice, not an ordinary
commercial enterprise.'73 However, there are several things about
Singley that merit close attention. First, the Mississippi Supreme
Court treated this professional dental practice as though it was a
business. Second, it was a case of first impression for them (res
nova, a "new thing," to a civilian). Third, as the Court surveyed,
extensively, the case law from many jurisdictions across the country
before ruling, the Justices were well aware of all the arguments and
their implications before handing down their ruling.
74
Mississippi's decision in Singley began simply enough, holding
that "goodwill should not be used in determining the fair market
value of a business, subject to equitable division in divorce cases."' 175
However, the key point of a case sometimes lurks in a seemingly
minor footnote and that is true here. 176 Footnote 2 of Singley contains
this gem: "We note that the Yoon court distinguished between
'business enterprise goodwill' and 'personal goodwill.' However, the
[Singley] parties did not mention such terms, much less distinguish
them in the record of this proceeding, thus this issue is not before the
Court.,
' 177
The Yoon case cited by the Mississippi Supreme Court was a
doctor's divorce action in Indiana. 178 The Singley court described
Yoon as "stating that Indiana law adheres to the rule that goodwill
based on the personal attributes of the individual is not properly part
of the marital estate.' ' 179 Yoon was remanded because the lower court
172. Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 15, § 2.4.
173. 846 So. 2d 1004 (Miss. 2002).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1010.
176. The most famous such footnote of all must be Justice Harlan F. Stone's
note 4 from United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4, 58 S.
Ct. 778, 784 n.4 (1938).
177. Singley, 846 So. 2d at 1010 (emphasis added).
178. Yoon v. Yoon, 711 N.E.2d 1265, 1269 (I11. 1999).
179. Singley, 846 So. 2d at 1010.
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did not break out "personal" goodwill from "commercial" goodwill.
The Indiana district court was instructed to make a factual
determination of the personal value component within the total
goodwill of the medical practice and to then deduct that amount from
the marital property.'
Singley's footnote 2 is very important for at least three reasons.
First, it graphically demonstrates the difficulty common law
practitioners have in realizing effects of the excessively broad and
poorly defined term "goodwill" as employed in divorce cases.
Second, the "two source, two effects" model cited in the 2002 Idaho
case note, and echoed in the articles found for this comment, is an
accurate depiction of the common law scheme.' Finally, the
Mississippi Supreme Court did grasp the implications of confusing
different types of goodwill. Their understanding of the key point of
Yoon is a foreshadowing of why they held personal goodwill is not
marital property.
Despite recognizing the "nebulous" nature of the term goodwill
in marital property divisions, the Singley court saw that "[g]oodwill
within a business depends on the continued presence of the particular
professional individual as a personal asset and any value that may
attach to that business as a result of that person's presence., 12 Again,
any panel of judges hearing this case anywhere within a civilian
jurisdiction would see these personal qualities as falling outside the
community and thus into the separate property of that person.
However, the Singley court next took a position quite
incompatible with both the civilian tradition's and the common law's
understanding of goodwill as attached to a business. Treating the
"value that exceeds the value of the physical building housing the
business and the fixtures within the business" as a part of business
goodwill is unremarkable."8 3 Similarly, there is nothing unusual in
observing the difficult and "nebulous" nature of personal goodwill.
However, the Singley opinion resolves this quandary by
"recogniz[ing] that goodwill is simply not property;" thus it cannot
be deemed a divisible marital asset in a divorce action.8 4
As a matter of law, within both traditions, the "not property"
statement simply goes too far. No civilian scholar would say in a
doctrinal work that "clientele" is never property. No common law
treatise would say "goodwill" is never property. The foundational
180. Yoon, 711 N.E.2d at 1270.
181. Beebe, supra note 145.
182. Singley, 846 So. 2d at 1011 (emphasis added).
183. Id.
184. Id. (emphasis added).
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common law cases held goodwill to be property. 185 Every French
scholar in Part Il.D. 1. saw "clientele" as marketable. Lindley in his
Partnership saw "goodwill" as equally marketable. Rather, goodwill
can only be property when (a) something is being sold and (b) that
"thing" is neither a person nor a part of a person's personality, as was
explained in the review of French doctrine. Thus, any court
remanding a Yoon-type case should have inserted the word "personal"
in that text, so that it read "[t]he difficulty is resolved however when
we recognize that personal goodwill is simply not property;" thus it
cannot be deemed a divisible marital asset in a divorce action.
186
b. New York, Represented by Moll v. Moll
There is nothing especially noteworthy in the New York case of
Moll v. Moll -8 -once one accepts the idea thatpersonal qualities are
divisible things. (But then there is nothing especially noteworthy
about "taking a negro to Nebraska," once one accepts the idea that
there is "no difference between hogs and negroes.") This case can be
read two ways. Perhaps it is only a fairly straightforward construction
of a statute by a common law trial court faithfully following the
binding precedent of the highest court within that jurisdiction.' On
the other hand, this case could serve as a bone-chilling example of
185. See Morgan v. Perhamus, 36 Ohio St. 517,522 (Ohio 1881) ("the good-will
of a trade or business, when connected to it, is property" (emphasis added)); see
also Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U.S. 436,446, 13 S. Ct. 944,
948 (1893) (holding that goodwill ceases when its underlying business ceases).
186. Readers who doubt this construction are welcome to try their hands at this
riddle: "What is the difference between a doctor and a radio station?" If cases such
as KFOX and Meredith Broadcasting were decided correctly, what is the rationale
for treating the goodwill attached to an M.D. differently from the goodwill attached
to a D.J.? See KFOX, Inc. v. United States, 510 F.2d 1365 (1975); Meredith
Broad. Co. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1214 (1971).
187. 722 N.Y.S.2d 732 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 2001).
188. Full consideration of the 'jurisprudence constante-stare decisis"
distinction between civil law and common law is beyond the scope of this paper.
Suffice it to say, here, that a trial court in France is not "bound" by the Cour de
cassation in the way that every American trial court is bound by a United States
Supreme Court opinion. For that matter, a Louisiana trial court is not bound by the
Louisiana Supreme Court in the way that a New York trial court (or a trial court in
the other forty-nine states) is bound by that state's supreme court. As Professor
John A. Lovett of the Loyola Law School has observed, "the Louisiana Supreme
Court has recently reminded the bar and other Louisiana courts thatjurisprudence
constante is only 'persuasive authority' and therefore a Louisiana court... 'is never
bound by the decisions which it formerly rendered' and 'can always change its
mind."' See John A. Lovett, Another Great Debate?: The Ambiguous Relationship
Between the Revised Civil Code and Pre-revision Jurisprudence as Seen Through
the Prytania Park Controversy, 48 Loy. L. Rev. 615, 701-02 (2002) (citing Doerr
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 00-0947 (La. 2000), 774 So. 2d 119, 129) (emphasis added).
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what can happen when laws are passed without either a sound
doctrinal foundation or an appreciation of the consequences of
expansive language.
The defendant husband was a highly successful stockbroker who
was facing two adverse events simultaneously; divorce and changing
employers. He argued there was no "thing" to be divided since his
"book of business" was not "his property or property at all."' 9 Mr.
Moll truthfully reported that Morgan Stanley Dean Witter owned the
client files, not he, and thus that he could not take the files with him
if he left. 9°
Mrs. Moll countered that an account executive "must nurture and
develop a relationship of trust and confidence with the client in order
to ensure the future business of the client." 91 She maintained "the
probability that clients will follow... [him] ... no matter which
firm employs him .. is the asset or 'thing of value' created during
the marriage."'92  She gave the court an affidavit from another
financial services company stating the common industry practice was
to pay a recruited broker what amounts to a "signing bonus" based
upon the broker's contacts and history. 93
The judge noted the close similarity between the "professional
goodwill" ascribed to the defendant husband and the Cruttwell case
considered in Part II.A. 1., opining that Mrs. Moll's "description of.
.. [Mr. Moll's] ... "book of business" compares favorably with the
legal definition of goodwill... [i]n the old English case of Cruttwell
v. Lye .... 194
Considering the problems stemming from the injection of
accounting into the conventional common law concept of goodwill
discussed in Part II, it is easy to understand why this trial court agreed
with Mrs. Moll's argument "that defendant takes too narrow a view
of the interest claimed to be marital property."' 95 The "[d]efendant's
'book of business' is not the customer accounts maintained by the
brokerage house. It is the personal or professional goodwill acquired
by defendant which is the "thing of value" plaintiff seeks to have
equitably distributed. This court is thus asked to decide whether the
personal or professional goodwill of a stock broker is marital property
as contemplated by Domestic Relations Law section 236(B)(1)(c)."' 96





194. Id. at 734.
195. Id.
196. Id. (emphasis added).
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Once the trial judge concluded that there was a "thing" here
classifiable as property, and that neither the personal quality nor the
intangible nature of that property barred its division, Moll became a
simple matter of statutory construction. Did the knowledge, skill, and
customer names embedded upon the memory pathways within the
defendant husband's brain constitute an item of marital property
within the reach of New York's Domestic Relations Law? Thisjudge
held that they did, interpreting section 236(B)(5)(e) of the Domestic
Relations Law to include "an interest in a profession or professional
career potential" as "marital property."' 97 The trial court then recited
no less than twelve New York cases in which things as diverse as
having been an opera singer, once holding a seat in Congress, or
being certified to administer a public school had all been held to be
marital property subject to partition because of "the 'enhanced
earning capacity' which the 'thing of value' provided to its holder." 1.98
There is no reasonable way to avoid outcomes such as Moll after
the passage of New York's Domestic Relations Law and their holding
of O'Brien. Still, one is reminded of a classic Lincoln cabinet
meeting story. "If I call a tail a leg, how many legs does a dog have?"
"Five," came the chorused reply. "No," said Lincoln, "four. Calling
a tail a leg does not make it one."' 99
c. New Jersey, represented by Seiler v. Seiler
Just across the Hudson River lies New Jersey. On facts nearly
identical to Moil, however, a court of appeal upheld a trial court's
ruling that the insurance agent husband had no goodwill.2"' Mrs.
197. Id. The original Moll text cited here contains an internal citation to the
initial Court of Appeals' (New York's "supreme court") landmark 1985 decision
in O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985), interpreting this section ofNew
York's Domestic Relations Law. O'Brien requires partitioning the personal
goodwill of a professional practice. Curiously, Frantz and Dagan believe "[t]he
O'Brien court actually went too far," citing with approval a comment by Scott and
Scott that O'Brien's methodology improperly takes into account "professional
experience, skill development, and seniority" that will occur in the future and so is
not yet attained or created when the marriage ends. See Frantz & Dagan, supra
note 23, at 107 n. 143 (citing Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as a
Relational Contract, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1225, 1322 (1998)).
198. Moll, 722 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
199. Innumerable accounts of this story abound. This one comes from Senate
testimony (statement of Roger J. Williams) in 1974: "Lincoln had a conundrum
which he allegedly used and it was: If you call a tail a leg, how many legs has a
dog? Someone would answer five. But Lincoln said, No, calling a tail a leg doesn't
make it a leg. Dogs only have four legs." Food Supplement Legislation: Hearings
on S. 2801 and S.3876 before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong. (1974) (statement of Roger J. Williams).
200. Seiler v. Seiler, 706 A.2d 249 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1998).
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Seiler argued that the goodwill attached to him at his Allstate agency
was a martial asset requiring equitable division.2"' The trial court
agreed goodwill was present but found that Mr. Seiler was only an
Allstate employee and thus any goodwill belonged to Allstate, not
him.2 °2 That a client might follow him to some other insurance
company was not dispositive of the issue. Moreover, Mrs. Seiler did
not seek to have the insurance agency assigned as a marital asset. The
appeal court could find no New Jersey case recognizing any goodwill
not associated with some business entity.2
0 3
Again, Moll can be easily explained by New York's quite stringent
Domestic Relations act. However, the Seiler-Moll case pair presents
another riddle opportunity: "How is a brokerage house that owns its
files different from an insurance agency that owns its files?" Messrs.
Moll and Seiler were both employees of service businesses where
being trusted by the customers was essential to success. Both knew
many people, both were trusted by many people; neither owned the
files nor the databases in their respective workplaces. So, what is the
principled basis for placing the memory, trust, knowledge, and
contacts of Mr. Moll within the community while excluding the
memory, trust, knowledge, and contacts of Mr. Seiler as separate
property not subject to division?
d Indiana, Represented by Frazier v. Frazier2°
The Indiana case of Frazier v. Frazier is very similar to the
discussion of Yoon in Singley because this Indiana appeal court, as
did the Yoon court, remanded the case with instructions to factor out
the personal goodwill and deduct it from the marital property.2 °5 The
other noteworthy feature of this case is how well it displays the
inherently problematic nature of the business valuation process.
Mr. Frazier appealed, in part, because the trial court did not
"distinguish between personal and enterprise goodwill" and "utilized
an improper method for calculating future earnings potential. '20 6 The
experts disagreed on the goodwill's source. One believed their
furniture store had scant goodwill without the husband, while the
other thought most business buyers would be able to run the store
themselves.2 7 Since the appeal court could not determine from the
record if any portion of the "aggregate value" of their business was
201. Id. at250.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 252.
204. 737 N.E.2d 1220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
205. Id. at 1226.
206. Id. at 1224
207. Id. at 1225.
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"attributable to the personal goodwill of' the husband, they remanded
the case for a determination of the enterprise goodwill with his
personal goodwill excluded.20 8
2. Common Law with Community Property
This category is as split in the treatment of goodwill in property
settlements as are common law states without community property.
The gap between New York and New Jersey is about as wide as that
between California and Texas. The California-Texas split has been
so well explored over the last thirty years or so that some articles deal
solely with it.209 In California, commercial and professional goodwill
are both community property.10 In Texas, neither professional nor
personal goodwill falls into the community, but commercial goodwill
does.2 "
Smith identifies three reasons why professional goodwill has been
so contentious and then gives three ways courts have addressed the
issue.212 Her three reasons are the vagueness of the term, its source
from a person, and the difficulty of measuring intangibles. 2 3 As
described by Smith, courts deal with the first problem, vagueness, by
not recognizing goodwill as community property, the Texas approach
in Nail."' Other courts, as California did in Golden, hold goodwill
does have a community value despite having "the touch and feel of
separate property."2 5 The third approach is represented by a case like
Geesbreght in Texas (although Smith does not cite that case at this
point in her article) where goodwill is part of the community and can
thus be divided if, and only if, it exists independently of an
individual.216
Smith's explanation of the discrepancy between California and
Texas is largely based on time. Did a court look "backward to when
the goodwill was developed or forward to when the goodwill will be
realized[?] 2 7 The "backward" orientation weighs heavily upon the
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., Catherine T. Smith, Two Community Property States Differ on
its Characterization and Division, 11 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 246 (1997).
210. See Golden v. Golden, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (sole medical
practitioner); Todd v. Todd, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (law practice).
211. See Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972) (personal/professional
goodwill arising from a doctor's divorce); Geesbreght v. Geesbreght, 570 S.W.2d
427 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (commercial goodwill arising in the medical field).
212. Smith, supra note 209, at 246-47.
213. Id.





"spouses during marriage contribut[ing] to each other's development"
such that "the reputation of the individual professional spouse was
developed to some extent during the course of the marriage" right
along with any other co-owned asset increasing in value during the
marriage.
On the other hand, Texas, in Smith's view, instead has something
of a "forward" orientation and so is "focused on the future earnings
the professional will derive in continuing his or her professional
occupation." '219 Of course, if goodwill "is attached to ... future
earning capacity" then it cannot fall into a community today because
this future income will arise only after the marriage, and therefore
also the community, is no more.
The "today or future?" aspect of goodwill was not the only reason
Texas rejected the California view.2 1 Smith saw Texas drawing the
classic "attached to a business, not to a person" distinction in
Geesbreght.222 The view of goodwill in Geesbreght is completely
consistent with the nineteenth century Cruttwell and Smith cases in
England. Although the facts are radically different, all three cases
revolve around a concept of goodwill being bound up in business and
not part of someone's personality. In essence, Geesbreght involved
a corporation, not a person.223
In early 1974, Dr. John Geesbreght worked for a company
supplying doctors for hospital emergency rooms. 24 He eventually
became the half owner of a successor corporation to his original
employer. By the time of the divorce in 1977, that company had
grown so large (ten full time and between fifty and one hundred part
time physicians) and so successful (contracts with eight hospitals)
that it was grossing more than $1,000,000 a year in billings.
The pertinent contested issue before the Court of Civil Appeals
of Texas, Second District, Fort Worth in Geesbreght was the trial
court's failure to include the corporation's goodwill in the property
218. Id. at 247-48.
219. Id. at 248.
220. Id. Frantz and Dagan agree with Smith on the effects of community
termination. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 23. They joined in the criticism of
O'Brien. See supra note 197.
221. Smith, supra note 209, at 248. The better view of"time" as an explanation
for the treatment of goodwill in court is that "time" is yet another example of an
error in legal logic induced by importing accounting and economics terms into law.
See infra Parts II.C. and II.D.
222. Smith, supra note 209, at 248.
223. Geesbreght v. Geesbreght, 570 S.W.2d 427,429-32 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
The custody dispute over the two children and the jurisdictional questions about the
actions in Illinois are outside the scope of this comment.
224. Id. at 434
225. Id. at 434-35.
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settlement. On remand, the panel held that the company itself
enjoyed a certain amount of goodwill value and was "therefore an
asset which would have value ... apart from John's person as a
professional practitioner. ' '226 Thus, "[i]t is clear that in the event John
sold his stock to another physician then save perhaps at Harris
Hospital there would be an opportunity to retain the contracts of [the
company] if the services of its employed physicians in the various
emergency rooms continued to be satisfactory., 227 Either Lord Eldon
or Sir John Romilly could have rendered the Geesbreght opinion.
Neither would have experienced any difficulty following its legal
reasoning.22s
While Geesbreght has earned, at a minimum, a measure of
grudging respect from supporters of the California cases, Nail has
been fiercely criticized.22  Mauldin, in a 1981 Tulane Law Review
comment, took great exception to Nail, primarily because of its focus
on the vesting of future income.2" This 1981 Tulane comment does
not contain a single Civil Code article, a single citation to civilian
doctrinal work, and- confines its historical research to a single
quotation, Justice Story's celebrated 1841 treatise on partnership."
Even there, this is the full extent of the discussion-of that definition:
"In the area of professional goodwill, courts have repeatedly relied on
the definition by Justice Story., 232 What should have been a glaringly
obvious disconnect between "an advantage or benefit.., acquired by
an establishment" and the personal characteristics of an individual
human being somehow escaped the attention of those in the
publication review cycle.23 3 Moreover, as was demonstrated earlier,
226. Id. at 436.
227. Id.
228. Geesbreght only cites nine cases, all from other Texas courts, so it followed
in Cruttwells and Smith's footsteps without citing them. Nonetheless, note the
unmistakable feel and flavor of Cruttwell in the phrases "opportunity to retain the
contracts" and "if the services of its employed physicians in the various emergency
rooms continued to be satisfactory." Id. A chance, the possibility, not a probability
or a guarantee, to retain the old customers... somewhere Lord Eldon, Sir John,
and Baron Lindley are saying "Hear, hear" in unison every time Geesbreght's
distinction is seen.
229. See Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 15, § 2.8 nn. 27-28 (Supp. 2002)
(discussing Geesbreght); Mauldin, supra note 23, at 319-20 (attackingNail as "not
convincing.., reasoning fails.., even more mystifying... even more questionable
in light of subsequent Texas cases.., basic flaw in all of the court's arguments..
. . BOGUS ISSUES .... The Nail court's rationale exemplifies the many
smokescreens raised....").
230. Mauldin, supra note 23, at 319.
231. Id.at314.
232. Id.
233. Id. (emphasis added). Mauldin's 1981 comment can also serve as yet
another example of accounting principles distorting law. All of the legal errors
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the Justice Story account of goodwill relied upon by Mauldin is the
wrong paragraph. 3 Of course, Nail is easily defended simply by
citing a single line from it: "[The goodwill] did not possess value or
constitute an asset separate and apait from his person, or from his
individual ability to practice his profession.,
235
Of course, not everyone agrees that goodwill attached to a person
and not to a business falls outside the community. That is the true
source of the California-Texas split. The inconsistent case law
between the two states is not because of a time orientation shift or of
the valuation difficulties. It is fundamentally a values dispute. The
key text of Golden lays out the Weight assigned to the value of
spousal support during marriage in California. "Under the principles
of community property law, the wife.. . [made a] .. . contribution to
any of the husband's earnings and accumulations during marriage"
and she is therefore "as much entitled to be recompensed for that
contribution as if it were represented by the increased value of stock
in a family business." '236
Lay aside, for the moment, the comparatively small scale, tactical
problem of equating a person with a business, as Golden does. Focus
instead on the "big picture." What is really happening when Nail
meets Golden? The dramatic conflict between two primary values,
freedom and contract, first seen by an English Lord in 1810 has
simply come 'round once again. Mrs. Golden is Cruttwell and Dr.
Nail is Lye. 37
C. Louisiana: A Mixed Common Law-Civil Law Experience
through the Ellington Case238
1. Issues Presented
The essential facts of the case were set out in the opening of the
Introduction, Part I. The chief value of Ellington was its role as a
catalyst in enacting Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801.2 in the 2003
Regular Session of the legislature (and, a year later, the revision of
flowing from the use of accounting methods described in Part II.C.2. are present in
the Mauldin comment.
234. See supra notes 38 & 108. The second Justice Story quote both
distinguishes professional goodwill from commercial goodwill and further excludes
professional goodwill from the "effects or interests" of a partnership. How then
could professional goodwill ever form a part of the "effects or interests" of a
corporation?
235. Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. 1972).
236. Golden v. Golden, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735, 738 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
237. Professor Harvey was right; "there are no solutions.., only issues that are
fought out again and again." Harvey, supra note 36.
238. Ellington v. Ellington, 36,943 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2003), 842 So.2d 1160.
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9:2801.2 prompted by an earlier draft of this comment). The case
itself did not break much new ground. The disputed value and nature
ofNECC's goodwill, appealed by both parties, is the focus of analysis
here.
The larger principle that business goodwill falls into the
community had been established twenty years earlier in Godwin.239
The trial court's conclusion that a cotton brokerage house is not a
professional practice so as to be separate property was treated as
unremarkable by the appeal court.240 The Louisiana Supreme Court
chose not to revisit the issue of why goodwill associated only with a
natural person should be subject to a community regime when it
declined to hear the case.241
2. The Holding of Ellington
The appeal court affirmed the trial court's blending portions of the
methodology and computations of each party's experts to partition
this community.242 The trial judge was well within the legitimate
range of his authority, the record amply supported the outcome
reached, and there was no abuse of discretion. The closest thing to an
oddity in Ellington is that Mr. Clark (Mr. Ellington's expert) seems
to have been the only person involved in the case who fully
appreciated that there might not be a "thing" here to partition. 43
Standing alone, Ellington would scarcely be noticeable. Absent
the addition of the new Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801.2 text, the
length of the string cite in a case such as Moll would merely increase
from "12" to "13," with "co-owned a family cotton brokerage
business"joining the list of occupations ("opera singer;" "investment
banker") justifying partition of personally-derived goodwill in the
property settlement of a divorce. 44
In Ellington, the trial court determined that the value of the
corporation varied with which spouse received it, the intangible asset
of its customer base is included in the value of the business, but
neither spouse had proposed a method properly valuing their
business. 5 Thus, the trial court was forced to employ features from
each spouse's expert testimony to fashion an equal partition of their
239. Id. at 1170 (citing Godwin v. Godwin, 533 So. 2d 1009 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1988)).
240. Id.
241. Ellington v. Ellington, 2003-1092 (La. 2003), 847 So.2d 1269 (writ denial).
242. Ellington, 842 So. 2d at 1170-71. Not assigning all of NECC's goodwill
to the spouses might also be an oddity.
243. Id. at 1164, n.5. See also supra note 24.
244. Moll v. Moll, 722 N.Y.S.2d 732, 735 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 2001).
245. Ellington, 842 So. 2d at 1168-69.
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community property. This was because neither the general principles
in the Civil Code nor the jurisprudence sufficiently addressed the
valuation of non-professional businesses.
The goodwill was reasonably weighed in Ellington, allowing for
the case law at the time and without taking into account any civilian
doctrine or the precepts underlying personality in Louisiana's Civil
Code. (One has to wonder how the court would have ruled if the
French doctrinal materials had been before it.) So, in all fairness,
based upon the case law it did have, and upon the way Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:2801 read at the time, a reasonable person can
defend the overall outcome of Ellington.
Additionally, much of this case-in fact, almost all of its
analysis-revolved around the standard, ever-present appeal issues of
"adequately supported by the record" and "abuse of discretion. ' 246
Appellate methodology and civil procedure are vitally important areas
of the law and have their proper place. However, there is nothing
remarkable in how the appeal court reviewed the findings and
judgment below.
The mathematical details and accounting jargon so painstakingly
documented in the record at this point in the Ellington opinion have
no significance to the thesis of this paper.247 If and only if personal
goodwill is subject to the community does valuation arise as a
contested issue for trial. If that point is made, Ellington simply
becomes a carbon copy of Moll. (Or, as some wag once observed, "If
you don't know where you are going any road will take you there.")
Once a court accepts the idea that a personal reputation falls into the
community, coming to grips with "how to partition someone's
reputation" becomes necessary. However, the better course of action
is to sort out what is and is not community before attempting a
246. Id. at 1165-66.
247. Id. at 1164. To simplify review by those readers who might be inclined to
check the math or the methodology, Appendix 1 contains the trial court's
undisturbed calculations. However, no part of the thesis of this comment is "the
wrong valuation method was used" or "the correct valuation method was improperly
applied." The only way to make Ellington a math error is to reduce the goodwill
of NECC by Ryan Ellington's thirty-seven percent as estimated by Mr. Clark. See
id. at 1169. The missing eight percent (37% + 55% = only 92%) must have been
attributed to Noble III and Denise, since only fifty-five percent was attributed by
Clark to Noble and none at all to Peggy. Id. By this logic, and accepting the theory
that personal goodwill is divisible, the community only owned fifty-five percent of
the goodwill of NECC. The other forty-five percent (37% + 8%) was owned by
their now grown sons and daughter. Of course the problem with this scenario is that
the offspring did not own NECC-the parents did. The discrepancy lies in
"owning" a portion of the goodwill in a business while not owning any of the
underlying business. Severing goodwill from a business is incompatible with both
the common law's view of goodwill and the civil law's view of clientele.
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partition. For example, "[Ms. Meeks, Peggy Ellington's expert
business valuator] specifically admitted that her estimated value
would be different if the company was acquired by anyone other than
Noble Ellington. '2 48 If the goodwill of the NECC firm was that
personal to him, how is his goodwill in the community? Again, the
problem with Ellington is not that it followed the Godwin precedent
which distinguished professions from businesses. The problem lies
in treating personal service rendered to buyers differently from
personal service rendered to patients or clients.
The Court next took into account the "non-competition" aspect of
the other Ellington family members remaining in the cotton brokerage
field if all of NECC were transferred to Peggy Ellington alone.
Nothing prevented any other Ellington family member from opening
another cotton brokerage house and recruiting "all of the [old]
customer base ... developed through the years."249  Even if she
"were [actually] capable of operating the business.., or even if she
could hire an experienced cotton buyer, she would almost certainly
have no customers" because none of the customer base was
attributable to her."'
There are two reasons why this whole block of dicta and
reasoning could not arise in, say, France. First, under the civilian
doctrine of "clientele," Noble and his sons, Ryan and Noble ElI,
would not only have to introduce the ex-wife Peggy to all their
clients, but they would likely also have to leave the cotton brokerage
business, at least in that area.2 5' Second, the high attributed goodwill
percentage, ninety-two percent, would lead a panel of civilian judges
hearing the case at trial to see Noble's business acumen as personal,
hence separate.
The peculiar nature of the goodwill in this case, so closely
associated with Noble Ellington, did give the trial court some pause.
"The trial court rejected the valuation method of Noble's expert,
Carlton Clark, because it did not include a value for goodwill and
instead used the capitalization of earnings method espoused by
Peggy's expert, Zoe Meeks, into which an amount for goodwill was
factored. 25 In its written reasons for judgment, the trial court saw
"Noble Ellington [as] the heart of the business. That is one of the
difficulties in attempting to use the ordinary meaning of goodwill in
248. Id. Meeks also "readily admitted that her opinion as to value was based
upon present management remaining the same." Id.
249. Id. at 1168.
250. Id.
251. Again, a non-competition agreement in the sale of a business or profession,
while the usual practice in France, is not binding as a matter of law. Trahan Survey,
supra note 152, at 3.
252. Ellington, 842 So. 2d at 1169.
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a community partition. Perhaps the answer is that NECC has an
intangible value which should be recognized but simply does not fit
the usual definition of goodwill.,
253
As used in innumerable American divorce cases since California's
1956 Mueller case, the "usual definition" of goodwill has surely
shifted over time. A key theme of subparts II.C. and ll.D. was the
ever widening gap, and its effects, between goodwill as first laid
down by Lord Eldon and goodwill as it is employed daily in family
law in the United States today. Carlton Clark, Noble Ellington's
expert, first said that there -was no goodwill in NECC but later
testified "the goodwill is personal and non-transferable without the
efforts of Noble Ellington. 254 (Note how well the "without the
efforts of Noble Ellington" language fits the civilian concept of
"introduction" described in Part II.E.1.) The trial court was not
consistent with classic civilian doctrine when it then found that the
"designation" of this value as "goodwill" or "simply [an] 'intangible
asset' or some other term should not be important."" The hallmark
of civilian thinking is the classification of things; the structured way
of organizing rights and duties.256 Instead, the trial court focused on
what this unclassified, unnamed thing did "to the value of the
business, irrespective of its designation.... In this court's opinion,
there is something which makes NECC a successful business. 257
The legal problem is that the valuable "something" in Ellington
is neither a material object, such as a high traffic corner location on
a busy interstate, nor an intangible or incorporeal right, such as a
trademark, a patent, or a copyright. The "something" here is the
unique and personal combination of skill, knowledge, and effort
bound up within a particular individual. Since the trial court
recognized the limitations of "goodwill" in its conventional business
sense, the judge sought a more concrete item that might capture the
"something" of value. The trial court determined the valuable thing
"being dealt with is the customer base which the company has built
through the years beginning in 1979. There is no magic in the term
'customer base' other than it may be free of the restrictive definitions
of goodwill. 258
It is one thing for a common law court to adapt and develop law
from the bench as a rule is needed. That is exactly the approach Lord
Eldon had to take in Cruttwell. A need arose, he fashioned a rule to




256. Tucker, supra note 13.
257. Ellington, 842 So. 2d at 1169.
258. Id.
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the law thereafter.259 It is quite another thing to abandon an old rule
without a substitute. Abandoning the "restrictive definitions of
goodwill" without a ready concept or doctrine to take its place is
rather like departing from a known location without a destination.
Reliance upon "customer base" alone cannot be helpful since
"customer book" yielded opposite results between Moll in New York
and Seiler in New Jersey.2  What the trial court did find helpful was
Mr. Clark's use of the term "customer base" after he had "den[ied]
the existence of goodwill., 261 That prompted the court to "review.
. . the Louisiana case law relating to goodwill, particularly...
[concerning partition of] community businesses. 26 2 In so doing, the
judge drew an "essential" distinction between cases holding that
goodwill "could not even be considered because of the nature of the
business" and cases where goodwill was present and disputed but "the
evidence did not establish a separate value based on goodwill." '263
The judge's survey of the Louisiana case law, which was explicitly
affirmed by the appeal court, found that "the only businesses...
excluded from... goodwill... [by]... the nature of the services
provided are medical, legal and engineering practices."264
However, the combination of Clark's testimony at the trial and the
submitted briefs led the trial court to conclude that "apparently Noble
Ellington contends that his cotton buying business should also be
excluded from having a goodwill value on the same basis as
physicians, attorneys and engineers. '' 265 Ellington's effort to have his
personal goodwill treated as a professional practice prompts two
observations. First, the French concept of a "profession," what they
call the "liberal professions," is far broader than we use that term.
They treat an insurance agency just as a medical practice.266 That
259. Edgar Bodenheimer, John B. Oakley, & Jean C. Love, An Introduction to
the Anglo-American Legal System 13 (2d ed. 1988) ("In such a case [referring to
situations with either no, or only ambiguous, authority available] the court must
articulate and supply a legal norm or principle which will decide the dispute
between the parties. Many of the rules and principles of the Common Law and of
Equity originated in this fashion.").
260. See supra Part III.B.2. Additionally, in Louisiana, the only sources of law
are "legislation and custom." La. Civ. Code art. 1. Cases, jurisprudence to a
civilian, are not a source of law (at least not according to the Civil Code).
261. Ellington, 842 So.2dat 1169.
262. Id. Use of case law as primary authority is strictly a common law principle.
Despite the conspicuous omission of "cases" from the "sources of law" in Louisiana




265. Id. at 1169-70.
266. See supra Part II.E. 1 (discussing the doctrinal works of the three pairs of
French authors, Marty and Raynaud, Aubry and Rau, and Malaurie and Ayns).
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undercuts Ellington because Americans tend to see a sharp distinction
between a "business" and a "profession." The French do not; they
treat both alike. If they do not, we should not, given our common
civil law heritage and the great extent to which our Civil Code
originated from France.267
Second, perhaps there actually is a truly principled reason,
undetected by this research effort, to treat professional goodwill
differently than commercial or business goodwill. Still, if this
undiscovered but dispositive factor is anything like the "knowledge,
skill, or reputation" of the doer of deeds, then wearing a "blue" versus
a "white" collar in the work place cannot explain the distinction.
"Class" might explain such a distinction but "logic" or "consistency"
cannot. Moreover, the distinction cannot be supported within a civil
law environment as shown by the French experience. Those who take
the position that some "critical mass" of education or skill (or...
income?) delineates the tipping point for the asset protection found in
"professional" status will quickly find themselves forced into making
a pair of "sheep" and "goats" lists of occupations.
The Godwin case relied upon by Ellington nicely illustrates the
operational difficulties of separating sheep from goats.268 The
Godwins' family business was quite similar to the Ellingtons' family
business. In both businesses the husband did the primary work:
carpet, drapery and wallpaper in Godwin; cotton brokering in
Ellington. Both wives supported the businesses by such things as
running the office and keeping the books. Neither business had large
tangible assets. Both wives claimed each business had several
hundred thousand dollars of goodwill value.269 Both husbands
contested the goodwill valuation, asserting neither business had such
value. The trial court believed Mr. Ellington was attempting to argue
that NECC's goodwill should be disregarded because he rendered a
service in the same way that doctors rendered services, which was the
267. Whether the origins of the Digest of 1808, and hence the proportionate
share of Louisiana's laws, are due to France or Spain has been the subject of much
scholarship. However, the "mainly French" or "mainly Spanish" debate over the
origin and quantity of code articles by country has no effect on the issues discussed
in this comment. See Rudolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of1808: Its Actual
Sources and Present Relevance, 46 Tul. L. Rev. 4 (1971); Robert A. Pascal,
Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor Batiza, 46 Tul. L. Rev. 603
(1972). As both countries are civilian, the consequences for Ellington should have
been the same, had either a civil code or classic civilian doctrine been consulted in
that case.
268. Godwinv. Godwin, 533 So.2d 1009 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988), writ denied,
537 So.2d 1165 (La. 1989).
269. See Ellington, 842 So.2d at 1163 (noting the Ellingtons' division of labor),
1170 (describing the Godwins' division of labor and describing the similarity of the
cases).
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husband's unsuccessful argument in Godwin.27° Of course, what both
husbands were trying to say was that the empty shell of their
respective companies had no value apart from their personal skill and
effort.
Nonetheless, Godwin distinguished "one man 'professional'
corporations" from a "commercial business" such as carpet and
wallpaper installations.27  Ellington's comparison of its facts with
Godwin's facts left no doubt that both husbands were "professionals"
in a colloquial sense but neither was in any legally recognized sense
a "professional." Thus, neither was entitled to exclude goodwill
attached to their persons.272 Specifically, Ellington found that a
cotton broker's relationship with his customers was more like a carpet
installer's customer relationships than a physician's relationship to
patients. Thus, Godwin was "a 'professional' carpet installer and
wallpaper hanger but his relationship with his customers was clearly
different from the relationship of a physician to a patient or an
attorney to a client." '273
Actually, the customer relationship was not "clearly different."
In Godwin, the carpet customers came to Lyn Joseph Godwin, not to
"the business," because they trusted him and liked his work. True,
the client relationship was not one of life or death as in medicine but
it is based upon the same element of personal trust nonetheless. The
same was true of Moll's brokerage customers. The same was true of
Seiler's insurance clients. For that matter, the same was true of on-air
radio hosts at KFOX. To say that goodwill is somehow "different"
because one lays carpet, another sells cotton, while the third fills
cavities is uncomfortably close to class as a justification. Moreover,
drawing this distinction is not doctrinally sound. As the French
sources demonstrate, the hallmark of a "liberal profession" being
transmitted by way of the "introduction" is the element of personal
service towards a customer base.274
Nevertheless, the Ellington court found that "NECC can and does
have an intangible asset value and whether that intangible value is
termed goodwill, customer base or something else is not important.
What is important, and also much more difficult, is using that
270. See id. at 1169 ("apparently Noble Ellington contends... [goodwill]...
should also be excluded"), 1170 ("As in this case, the husband claimed .... ). The
latter construction is more forceful and direct.
271. Id. at 1170.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Readers who doubt this interpretation must find an alternate way to explain
why an insurance agent and a doctor in France each has a marketable clientele and
why each performs an introduction as an obligation of the sale.
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intangible value in determining the total value of the business. 275
The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court in both respects; (1) that
NECC had goodwill and (2) that goodwill was "predominantly
attributable to NECC's customer base." '276 Of course NECC did not
have a customer base. Noble Ellington had a customer base. Of
course Noble Ellington was not NECC but he, like Lyn Godwin
before him, was treated as though he and the company were
interchangeable, indistinguishable substitutes for each other. The
often heard colloquialism, "I am the company," became literally,
legally true.
Still, in the last analysis, and again based upon what was within
the field of view of the trial and appellate courts, a reasonable
decision was reached in Ellington. Unfortunately for the soundness
and logic of the law, reliance upon the confused and degraded
concept of goodwill found in today's common law yielded a result
inconsistent with civilian law principles.
D. The Legislative Response to Ellington
1. Tracking the Language of Senate Bill 844 through the 2003
Regular Session
Noble Ellington's waking hours were not confined to the sale of
cotton. He also serves as a Louisiana State Senator. As a result of his
divorce experience, he introduced a bill to change how the law treats
personal goodwill in property settlements.277 That bill eventually
became law, taking effect on August 15, 2003. The second version
of the bill appears to have been narrowly tailored to precisely fit the
circumstances of Senator Ellington's divorce. The third and final
versions of the bill were quite general in scope.
The original text of Senate Bill 844 included all types of
businesses and professions. It did not attempt to factor out "personal"
from "business" goodwill.27 On the plus side, it called out
Cruttwell's "old customers will keep coming back" principle, but not
limiting goodwill to only that aspect detracted from the bill. As a
result, the original Senate Bill 844 would have intensified the
muddled current common law understanding of goodwill by including
any factor that increases the value of a business beyond its physical
assets.
275. Ellington, 842 So.2d at 1170.
276. Id.
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The second version, the "engrossed" bill, was somewhat of an
improvement, in that it started to exclude qualities personal to the
owner.2" However, that protection was promptly lost by an excessive
limitation, the eighty-five percent ownership exclusion. A better
approach would exclude whatever portion of goodwill the fact finder
determined as exclusively due to one of the parties. This version
most closely reflects Senator Ellington's personal circumstances.
The reengrossed version was the second amendment to the bill,
being the third version of the text.28" Had this bill become law,
Louisiana would be very close to a Singley-type position. This bill is
still not quite doctrinally sound because its first two lines allow and
define goodwill, while the latter lines exclude it. Since this section
of the Revised Statutes only deals with community property issues,
the better approach would have been to begin with line fourteen as the
first line of the new law but reading instead "The community shall not
include the intangible ....
The law as finally passed, the fourth version considered, only
applies to commercial businesses, excluding professions. Moreover,
the use of the word "solely" has profound implications to retaining
business spouses attempting to avoid an Ellington-type outcome.
2 °1
2. What if Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801.2 Had Been the
Law for the Ellington Trial?
Goodwill is excluded only when it is solely due to a personal
quality of the owner-to his "identity, reputation, or qualifications"
or to "his relationship with customers of the business." Moreover,
under Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801.2 as enacted, Peggy
Ellington need not show that she had ever been responsible for any of
the "goodwill" of the business. In Ellington, just the testimony of
Noble Ellington's own expert alone would have been sufficient to
destroy the "solely" exclusion. Mr. Clark testified that "55% of the
customer base of the company is attributable to Noble Ellington and
37% is attributable to Ryan Ellington.,, 282 The "solely" exclusion of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801.2 must disappear on those facts.
Of course, again based upon the effect of the word "solely," the eight
percent of goodwill left over for Noble III and Denise Ellington
(assuming no goodwill arose from Peggy) also destroys the exclusion.
279. S.B. 844, 2003 Leg. (La. 2003) (engrossed), available at http://
www.legis.state.la.us.
280. S.B. 844, 2003 Leg. (La. 2003) (reengrossed), available at http:/
www.legis.state.la.us.
281. 2003 La. Acts No. 837.
282. Ellington, 842 So.2d at 1169.
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The last possibility is that eight percent of the goodwill was
attributable to Peggy.
It does not matter which of these three possible sets of allocations
a court adopts as correct. All of them will reproduce the identical
outcome of Ellington. If anyone has any part of the goodwill,
"solely" simply cannot apply. That puts all of the personal goodwill
back into the community just as though this law had never been
enacted. Thus, any trial on similar facts today (any service business
whose customer base identifies with one spouse but not the other)
should produce the same outcome as Ellington despite this new law.
In the Louisiana Senate Bill of 2003, the only way a business owner
could exclude his personal goodwill from a community business was
to demonstrate that he, and he alone, generated one hundred percent
of the goodwill attached to that community business.
3. Has the New Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801.2 Resolved
the Goodwill Problem in Louisiana?
No, it has not. Use of the word "solely" in the statute renders the
amendment meaning-less. Of course, what Senator Noble Ellington
wanted-as did a majority of the legislature and Governor
Foster-was to prevent all future Mister Noble Ellingtons finding
themselves in the position of paying their ex-spouses what amounts
to ransom for the privilege of being themselves. What is required,
either to preclude another partition outcome as Mr. Ellington
experienced or to codify the result of a case such as Singley in
Louisiana (depending upon how much personal interest one may have
in the question) is to amend Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801.2.
Unless the statute is revised to read something like "That portion of
the goodwill solely attributable to one spouse will be excluded from
the community," nothing in the law as passed and signed will prevent
another Ellington-type partition. If the legislature wishes to preclude
Ellington-type outcomes, Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801.2 must
either shed or qualify the word "solely." Part IV.B. makes a
comprehensive set of legislative recommendations to correct the
"solely" problem.
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. The Superior Civilian Rationale Underlying "Clientele"
There is no need to change the terminology about goodwill, nor
must the existing commercial case law be overturned. Still, these
few "modest proposals" would suffice to eliminate much of the
2005] 1255
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confusion generated by the use of a single term with so many different
meanings.
1. The "Source-Effect" Concept Should Be Abandoned
Goodwill should only have legal recognition in two varieties,
"commercial" and "personal." A working definition for the two terms
would combine the best parts of each pair of terms in the present
"source-effect" concept. The following meld of generic terms from the
world of business valuation and a 2002 casenote could be a good start.23
Commercial goodwill attaches only to a business entity itself and
consists of both intangibles (such as the reputation of a commercial
business or trade partnership, product names, and trademarks) and
tangibles (such as retail store and restaurant locations, lists of customers
not bound by a contract, and a skilled labor force). Commercial goodwill
is distinct from the personal reputation, qualification, or skills of the
owners. This commercial goodwill is an asset with a determinable value
because it will transfer to the new owner of the business upon the sale of
the business to a willing buyer by a willing seller. Sale of a business is
automatically sale of its goodwill by operation of law. Goodwill may
have a positive, negative, or neutral value. Goodwill may not be
purchased apart from the business. The two are indivisible; purchase of
either is purchase of both.
In contrast, personal goodwill originates from the individual owner's
or practitioner's reputation, knowledge, contacts, experience, skill, or like
personal qualities of an individual. It is always attached to that
individual and is never associated with any business entity, partnership,
or other artificial person. Since the personal qualities of the individual
owner, tradesman, artist, or practitioner (such as a doctor, lawyer,
engineer, or accountant who holds any required licenses or permits) are
the sole source of personal goodwill, this type of goodwill is not subject
to any type of forced distribution, partition, or allocation in any
proceeding, domestic or commercial.
Nonetheless, and solely at the option and free choice of the
individual owner or practitioner, some aspects of personal goodwill may
yet be sold or transferred. For example, a non-competition agreement is
actually the sale of personal goodwill. An agreement to perform
introductions of the new owner of a business to the existing customers
or to endorse the new owner are similarly sales of personal goodwill.
Violations of agreements by a seller of personal goodwill shall have the
exclusive remedies of damages and injunctions. Affirmative specific
283. These definitions and their effects are drawn from Beebe, supra note 145,
and from general civilian traditions about personality and the enforceable scope of
strictly personal duties.
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performance by a seller shall never be a remedy for breach of a personal
goodwill contract.
2. The Goodwill Concept, as Applied in Law, Should Not Be
Merged with Either "Going Concern " or "Non-competition"
Agreements
There is nothing improper, and much commendable, with
accounting professionals determining amongst themselves how the
commercial goodwill of a business entity will be measured or how often
it shall be tested for impairment before it can be listed on a balance sheet.
Nothing in this comment suggests or requires amending anything in
SFAS 141 or 142, nor intends to suggest that Congress revisit the tax
treatment of commercial goodwill. By the same token, however, no
one's rights, liberties, or property interests should be shoe-homed into
some accounting methodology devised in another discipline for another
set of reasons. To the extent that property rights are subject to secular
authority, that authority must reside primarily in elected and accountable
legislatures, not in the deliberations of private bodies standardizing
financial reports. The scope of separate property within a marriage
simply cannot be a function of bookkeeping, no matter how useful or
necessary accounting methods may be within the field of business.
Adoption of the following principles as legal guidelines would clarify
how limited the concept of commercial goodwill ought to be in a court
of law in any jurisdiction:
Principle 1: Commercial goodwill does not presume that the
business being purchased is a "going concern." A business need
not be a going concern to have goodwill, nor must its goodwill
always be positive. A commercial business may have negative
goodwill for any number of reasons: its reputation is poor, its
retail locations are undesirable, its plant is obsolete, and so on.
Principle 2: Purchase of a business does not automatically
create a non-competition agreement. Any agreement not to
compete must be express, shall be strictly construed, and shall
conform to the statutes of that jurisdiction.
B. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801.2 Should Be Amended to
Delete or Qualify the Word "Solely 2 84
The scope of the initial version of Senate Bill 844 was quite broad.
Goodwill applied to "any community owned corporate, commercial or
284. The 2004 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature amended R.S.
9:2801.2 as suggested by this comment, choosing to employ the civilian language
rather than the alternate common law version. See 2004 La. Acts No. 177.
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professional business" and all three were to be treated alike. 85
Consistent treatment of goodwill, regardless of business form, is in
keeping with the civil law's best and deepest traditions of personality,
separate property, and all types of community regimes. There is no
principled reason for excluding personal goodwill in professional
practices (Depner, McCarron) while including it commercial businesses
(Godwin, Ellington).286 Happily, building coalitions in the legislature for
any particular piece of legislation is outside the scope of this comment.
Nonetheless, should the legislature concur that its recent goodwill
amendment needs amending, this comment offers a few suggested
revisions to Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801.2.
One proposed amendment to Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801.2
could read:
In a proceeding to partition the community, the court may
include, in the valuation of any community-owned
corporate, commercial, or professional business, the goodwill
of the business. However, that portion of the goodwill
attributable to the identity, reputation, or qualifications of the
owner or from his relationship with customers of the business
shall not be included in the valuation of any type of
business.287
This text presumes that the business will be awarded to one spouse
before the valuation is made. If the valuation is to be made before
allocating the business to one or the other spouse, then "owner"
should be replaced with "a spouse."28
Another wording could be less specific, replacing the presently
enumerated qualities of the spouse receiving the business with more
285. S.B. 844, 2003 Leg. (La. 2003) (original), available at
http://www.legis.state.la.us.
286. Depner v. Depner, 478 So. 2d 532 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985); McCarron v.
McCarron, 501 So. 2d 233 (La. 1987).
287. Those unfamiliar with the Louisiana Civil Code should not focus on the
word "his." See La. Civ. Code art. 3506 ("[T]he terms of law, employed in this
Code.... shall be understood as follows: 1. The masculine gender comprehends
the two sexes, whenever the provision is not one, which is evidently made for one
of them only...").
288. There is some dispute as to the significance of the order of the steps in the
partition process of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801(A)(4). If the steps are
sequential, which comports with the logic of a code, then subsection (a), valuing the
assets, must take place before subsections (b), dividing the assets, (c), allocation,
or (d), paying of an equalizing sum of money, can occur. While this sequential
issue was raised on appeal, the trial court was upheld in its decision to assign NECC
first and then value it afterwards. Ellington v. Ellington, 36,943 (La. App. 2d Cir.
2003), 842 So.2d 1160, 1170. Because there is some uncertainty on this point, both




general language. Articles in the classic codal civilian tradition are
usually more general in nature than in the digest format to allow some
increased flexibility to judges.289 Such a text might read:
In a proceeding to partition the community, the court may
include, in the valuation of any community owned corporate,
commercial, or professional business, the goodwill of the
business. However, that portion of the goodwill attributable
to any personal quality of the spouse awarded the firm shall
not be included in the valuation of a business.
If something like the first wording is adopted, the issue will turn
on the expert opinions presented by the contending spouses. Did the
wife's personal attributes generate fifteen percent of the goodwill in
the company's value? Forty-seven percent? Eighty-five percent? If
the second wording is chosen, there will be two points of dispute.
The first will likely be a matter of law; what aspects of a person are
a "personal quality" and which are not? Once the cadre ofjudges and
doctrinal authors establish what is and is not "personal," the "battle
of the experts" will still be joined over how much of the residual
goodwill value is "personal" and how much is "commercial."
The choice itself of any remedial approach is something of a value
judgment. If the legislature desires to maintain, if not increase, the
influence of the civilian tradition in Louisiana, the second wording
will be adopted. If not, the first choice will prevail. In any event, if
the legislature intends to preclude another Ellington-esque partition,
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801.2 must either drop the word
"solely" or qualify it. If the legislature desires to best honor both the
underlying values of the civil law and the autonomy created through
289. Although it is outside the scope of this comment, the tension between a
"code" and a "digest" has been a regular feature of Louisiana's legal history from
statehood. There was a Digest of 1808, but a Code of 1825, largely driven by the
Cottin case of 1817. Vernon V. Palmer, Death of a Code-the Birth of a Digest,
63 Tul. L. Rev. 221, 226 (1988). "The present [1988] Revision [of Louisiana's
Civil Code] also merits the designation digest because it too is designed to be
supplemented by outside sources (codified and jurisprudential), and because the
overall ensemble does not have the internal coherence and completeness of a code."
Id. Moreover, what Professor Palmer forecasts as a crisis "will place in issue the
transformed nature of our codification, the judge's increased role as creative
rulemaker, the authority of the decided case when it is detached from a legislative
base, and the existence of a Louisiana common law that supplements the enacted
law." Id. There is a good argument waiting to be made that Ellington 's eschewing
the Civil Code and relying only upon cases is both a "detachment from a legislative
base" as well as "a Louisiana common law." Future scholars looking for cases to
test Professor Palmer's forecast would do well to include Ellington in a full test of
Palmer's criteria.
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centuries of common law development, it will exclude all personal
attributes from the community regime.
C. A Few Final Reflections
This comment has been about goodwill in property settlements.
However, goodwill disputes do not occur in isolation inside a divorce.
Inevitably alimony, spousal support, education credits, child support,
visitation, and a host of other issues swirl about in the legal cauldron
that is the breakup of a marriage. If one spouse has no other job or
career in hand for income after a divorce, the quite understandable
temptation is to reach for a larger share of the marital property.
Goodwill offers one way to achieve that, particularly when the major
source of the value of the family business is a personal characteristic
solely attributable to the knowledge, skill, or personal contacts of the
other spouse.
In truth, though, the presence or absence of any career potential
for the spouse without the contacts or skill is irrelevant. If the
business has value largely, if not wholly, derived from a characteristic
peculiar to and confined in one spouse, no amount of training or
education by the other spouse, or the lack of it, will affect that
business value. If customers come to Jane Doe because they like her
dress, or her golf course, designs, neither John Doe's having only a
second grade education nor his attaining a second Ph.D. will affect
the public's desire for Jane's designs. If the value of the "Doe
Designs, LLC" is attributable only to her personal characteristics and
not to the efforts or knowledge of John, then there is nothing to
divide, allocate, or compensate.
Philosophers and marriage counselors can debate-as lawyers and
each party's retained business valuators must do today-the
intangible contributions of one spouse to the success of the other.
Finally persuading your husband, especially after years of effort, to
use the word "manure" is a fine thing. However, are such
contributions as that refinement something that affects the valuation
of a lawyer's practice or a carpet layer's business in any way that a
judge can reasonably be expected to determine? Or the value
enhancement to some other commercial enterprise? Will any degree
of sophistication in an accounting model used to calculate and
forecast someone's future earnings ever be able to quantify the proper
"compensation" of thirty years of language policing and manure
nagging?
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Do we really want to (re)define marriage 2 ° as an institution that
confers, even after its dissolution, a lifetime "entitlement" to half of
another person's income, regardless of either party's subsequent
circumstances? These are questions beyond the competence of any
court to resolve. Requesting what amounts to a flat lien on the future
income of your ex-spouse under some variety of an "I contributed at
home" rationale comes down to "I want to be treated like a doctor's
wife even after I am no longer a doctor's wife. 29 1
Ascribing the goodwill attached to a business to a person is the
moral equivalent of slavery.292 Such a practice is acceptable only if
we are unwilling to see any difference between "a hog and a negro."
Dividing goodwill based upon a personal characteristic is
intellectually the same as seeing no difference between a person and
a business. Businesses are things; people are not. Hogs and hard
drives are subject to partition; human beings are not.
"Clientele" and "introduction" arise from a superior
understanding of the proper scope and meaning of what the common
law knows as "goodwill." Family law must stop its unfortunate
reliance upon misapplied accounting concepts and confine the use of
goodwill to its original and still legitimate sphere--commercial
transactions between willing buyers and willing sellers.
(Mr.) Kelly M Haggar*
290. Concerning the (re)definition of marriage, and the consequences of
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003), again, this comment
is not affected by the "gay marriage" debate. Sex of the other spouse-or, for that
matter, the numbers of other spouses-will not affect goodwill. If one person
cannot have a property interest in the personality of another person, then it does not
matter how many other spouses there can be, nor does it matter how many of them
are of which sex. See supra note 11.
291. In re Marriage of Ceilley, 662 N.W.2d 374 (2003). See Appendix 2 for the
full flavor of Ceilley, which nicely bundles many of the issues in this comment
within a scant page and a half. A stranger to the institution of marriage would not
be able to tell that the relationship described in Ceilley and explored by Frantz and
Dagan were, in fact, the same legal entity.
292. Frantz and Dagan, supra note 23, at 110 n.159, report a case [Severs v.
Severs, 426 So.2d 992, 994 (Fla. App. 1983)] suggesting that dividing increased
earning capacity might be involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment.
This comment argues a moral equivalence to slavery, not a legal one. However, it
might nonetheless be possible to develop a legal equivalence to slavery, at least in
Louisiana, due to the operational effects of La. Civ. Code art. 2369.3. However,
pursuit of that topic is outside the scope of this comment.
* J.D./B.C.L. Candidate, May 2005, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana
State University.
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APPENDIX A
The Second Circuit's Recitation of the Ellington Trial Court's
Valuation Methodology and Findings for the Noble Ellington Cotton
Company, Inc. in Ellington v. Ellington 842 So.2d 1160, No. 36,943-CA
(La. App.2d 03/18/03), 1164, 1165.
Specifically, the trial court found that:
(a) The standard definitions of "fair market value" in normal
accounting practice are not adaptable to the partition of a
community-owned business in which one of the parties is
allocated the entire business.
(b) The net asset approach used by Carlton Clark is
inappropriate in this case.
(c) One of the methods employed by Zoe Meeks-the
capitalization of earnings method-is appropriate in this case,
but not if based upon a single year's earnings.
(d) NECC has an intangible asset value which supports the use
of the capitalization of earnings method.
(e) The determination of "normalized net income" for use in the
calculation of the value of the business is appropriate if based
upon several years earnings, in this case, 10 years, because the
records for that period are available.
(f) Ms. Meeks' calculation of adjustments in arriving at
normalized net income is appropriate.
(g) Mr. Clark's calculation of liabilities exceeding tangible assets
by $55,000 is accepted.
In order to use the greatest number of years available to determine
normalized earnings, it is necessary to use the 2001 figures from Mr.
Clar"s report because they are not included in Ms. Meeks' report. Mr.
Clark's Adjusted Income Statement Summary shows a loss of $142,870
for 2001. The court's procedure thereafter (in each case rounding the
amount to the nearest $100) is as follows:
(1) Add the normalized Pre-tax Income (Loss) for each of the
years from Ms. Meeks' Income Statement Adjustments.
[$136,700 + $221,500 + $220,500 + $197,000 + $181,600 +
$217,700 + $251,900 + -$347,700 + $234,200]
(2) Add the adjusted loss figure for 2001 from Mr. Clark's
report, as shown above, in order to arrive at a ten year total. [+ -
$142,900]
(3) Add $18,000 (based upon $750 per month for the years 2000
and 2001) for expenses paid by NECC but attributable to
Ellington-Weaver Cotton Company ("EWCC") as shown on
Noble Ellington's amended detailed descriptive list. [+ $18,000]
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(4) Divide the total by 10 to reach the average annual
normalized pre-tax income. [$1,188,500 divided by 10 =
$118,850]
(5) Deduct 34% as the estimated provision for income taxes
[$118,850- $40,500 = $78,300]
(6) Divide the balance by 22.5% (Ms. Meek" discount rate in
calculating today's value of a benefit stream that will be
realized over an extended period of time in the future).
[$78,300 divided by 22.5% = $348,000] [FN6]
FN6. The parties have not questioned the 22.5% used by
Ms. Meeks.
(7) Deduct the $55,000 negative net worth calculation by Mr.
Clark based on tangible
assets. [$348,000-$55,000 = $293,000]
The result is a company value of $293,000 if the company is allocated
to Noble Ellington, and, in that event, the value to Noble Ellington of
Peggy Traylor's one-half interest is therefore $146,500.
APPENDIX B
The Court of Appeals of Iowa's Affirmation of the Iowa District Court
for Polk County's Findings and Holding in In re the Marriage of Roger
I. Ceilley and Katherine L. Ceilley 662 N.W.2d 374 (2003)
In fixing the value of the marital estate, the trial court found
Roger's share of his medical practice to be worth $303,000. Kay
challenges this finding because the figure was based only on hard
assets, with no allowance for good will. Kay points out that good will
can exist in a professional practice for purposes of setting alimony. In
re Marriage of Bethke, 484 N.W.2d 604,607 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); In
re Marriage ofHogeland, 448 N.W.2d 678,681 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989).
Kay's initial difficulty with this challenge is with the record, which is
overwhelming that medical practices in Des Moines are routinely
bought and sold with no allowance for good will. Kay confronts this
initial difficulty by distinguishing between equity good will, that is
good will as we commonly understand it, and personal good will.
Citing cases form other jurisdictions, Kay asks us to recognize "equity
good will," and distinguish [it] from "personal good will" as a marital
asset subject to property division. Frazier v. Frazier, 737 N.E.2d 1220,
1225 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Prahinski v. Prahinski, 321 Md. 227, 582
A.2d 784, 786-87 (Md. 1990); Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429,
434 (Mo. 1987).
But once again Kay is confronted with the record. Roger paid
nothing for good will when he acquired an interest in the practice; he
is under a contract with his partner associate that specifies good will
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should carry no value in the event, for buy-in purposes, of the
retirement, debts, or disability of either partner. Both Roger and his
partner testified they have an oral agreement that the same provision
would apply if either of them leaves the practice for any other reason.
Because of Roger's contract with his partner, any "personal good will"
that might be assigned to his medical practice is nothing more than a
part of his remarkable earning capacity, a matter we have already noted.
Although Kay's expert witness assigned an equity good will value to
the practice, on our de novo review we agree with the trial court finding
that good will has no value as an asset in Roger's medical practice.
Because it has no factual basis in the evidence, we need not and do not
decide the legal principle the case suggests.
Because it determined Kay had not shown a need for it, the trial
court refused Kay's request for permanent alimony. Kay challenges the
refusal, contending Roger's enormous earning capacity proves he could
readily pay the $300,000 annually she says would be required to
maintain the lifestyle she enjoyed during the last years of the marriage.
No doubt Roger has the ability to pay. Kay points out that a $300,000
award would, after tax consequences are factored, "cost" Roger only
$209,501 which is thirteen percent of his current income.
Alimony is derived from a duty to support. It arises from the ability
of one former spouse to pay, and the need of the other to receive. The
need exists when necessary to enjoy the standard of living that existed
during the marriage. Once that standard is assured, alimony becomes
inappropriate.
In former times, alimony served a punitive function, and might
have been awarded accordingly without a showing of need. This is no
longer true. See Rosemary Shaw Sackett & Cheryl K. Munyon,
Alimony: A Retreat from Traditional Concepts of Spousal Support, 35
Drake L. Rev. 297, 303-06 (1986).
The record is clear that Kay has no need of alimony. Her average
monthly expenditures during the three months prior to trial were less
than $9000. The trial court pointed out that earnings from her half of
the marital estate, invested conservatively, would yield several times
that-after taxes. When she reaches the age of sixty, the added
disposable income from retirement plans will increase dramatically,
and will do so again when she reaches sixty-five. The equal division
of the vast marital estate, unchallenged on this appeal, was certainly
appropriate. It left Kay extremely wealthy. Because nothing more was
required to maintain her comfortable lifestyle, alimony was correctly
refused.
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